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Abstract

Logic, as a discipline, a tool for making knowledge,
and a way of thinking, has been intimately connected to
composition since the dawn of literacy.

This paper surveys

the definition and etytnology of logic, briefly traces the

history of its reiiation to composition, and examines how
logic, both formal and informal, has been incorporated into
the teaching of composition in American colleges.

Cultural

and intellectual,forces that impact the relationship between

composition and logic are discussed, providing a context for
recommendations regarding the place of logic in the
curriculum.

Logic and rhetoric were taught together in ancient
Greece and Rome and in Christian Europe for over twenty

centuries.

Since; the mid^

the 19th Century, the

discipline of formal logic has grown exponentially, and
today's students learn little or none of it.

Meanwhile, the

three-year rhetoric course common in American colleges a
century ago has been condensed into less than a year.

The

discipline of,informal logic arose to fill the vacuum by

applying logicai; principles to the creation and analysis of
discourse.

Modern composition textbooks include material oh

writing logically and avoiding logical fallacy.

But many

presentations of logic in composition textbooks are faulty,
•

■ iii ■' ■ ■

■ ■•

• '

and other practiGes, such as auto-biographical writing, are

competing successfully with the traditional, logic-based

pedagogy for instructional time and interest.

This is

occurring at a tirtie when logic is increasingly suspect
within the university, and in the context of a popular youth
culture that is strongly anti-rational.

As a result, and in

spite of various reform movements, the ability of students

to think critically and write logically has continued to
slip.
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This paper's findings are that the position of logic in
the curriculum needs to be strengthened to enable students
to make sense of what they are asked to learn and

participate in the discourse community of their chosen
field; that one or two courses taken as freshmen are

insufficient for this purpose; and that instruction in

logical principles needs to begin early and be presented
coherently.
advanced.

Some recommendations for curriculum are

A philosophical defense of logic is offered

against "anti-foundationalism."
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Several years ago (has it really taken this long to get
to the introduction ot my

jaas^ it- has), Dr.

Haviland, director of the Writing Center at CSUSB, referred

to me a student, "Carlos," whose writing showed deficiency

in logic.

His opinion paper Was laced with professor^

comments that he found irritating:

"Not a valid inference,"

"Be specific," "What is your authority for this?" and so on,
and it had a failing grade.

Carlos was frustrated.

He was

also determined to succeed, on his own terms if possible, on

the instructor's terms if necessary.

He did not share his

instructor's low opinion of his paper, but was willing to

change it, especially if given reasons more meaningful than
the coercion of grades and graduation credit.

He wanted

reasons why his own reasoning had been judged insufficient.
In essence, Carlos was challenging American higher education

to explain and justify some of its basic premises.

Dr.

Haviland assigned him to me because I was rumored to possess
a logical mind.

Energized by Dr. Haviland's confidence and determined
to help Carlos succeed (lest it be discovered that I didn't

have a logical mind),; I met with Carlos several times that
quarter.

He had the sort of inquiring mind that makes

teaching interesting, and maddening.
comments were to the point.
does he mean, be specific?

His questions and

What's a valid inference?
I am specific!

This is an

What
-

;

opinion paper; why do I nee4 an authority?

It was soonr

evident that Carlos had an aptitude for logic at least as
high as his tutor's, and I became convinced that the faulty

reasoning evident in his writing did not reflect a want of

ability.

Of that> he had plenty.

■

Of formal training in

reasoning skills, he had had little, but he was getting it
now in college, and he had that faculty of intuifii'-e^^ ^ ; :
reasoning that Aristotle identified as the source of

knowledge-making (naus, as the Greeks called it).

More

experience in persuasive writing would doubtless have made
this assignment easier; at the point at which I joined his
education, he needed help quickly, and I was at a loss as to
where to begin.

He had missed so much, it seemed.

As I

tried to set priorities on what to teach him, I came to see
that one quarter of instruction was not enough time to learn
the language of academia.

But we muddled through, and with

a change of attitude and a lot of effort, he managed to pass
the course.

What I tried to do was to make him use the reasoning

skills he already employed without hesitation to question ■'
authority whenever the opportunity to do so presented
itself.

The epiphany, as I recall it, came during one of

our verbal fencing matches about course requirements.

Why,

he wanted to know, was it necessary in an opinion paper to
use rigorously correct reasoning, when he knew how he felt

2

about the issue, the instructor already haci hi

all opinions are respected in the academy?

opinion, and

GoOd question,

although dlert ireshmen soon learn that the third premise
ish'fc true, nor shouid it be.

The exchange that followed,

cleaned up a bit to make me appear a better tutor than I
was, went something like this:

Good question.

Met

(Pause)

Am I right in saying

that you feel entitled to a reasonable
explanation for the requirement that your
paper employ sound reasoning?

■ ■ ■ ;:

Yea., Vik'

Carlos:

That in the absence of a reasonable

Me:

explanation, you would be less inclined to
accept this requirement?
Carlos

That's right.

Me:

Would you say that your classmates, and
people generally, share your feeling that
reasons should be advanced to justify what
they are asked to do?

Carlos

Sure.

Me:

Would you then deny to your readers an
entitlement that you claim for yourself?

Carlos:

;v

Everybody feels that way.

[Puzzled look, followed by a dawn of

w

recognition, a barely suppressed grin, and
better writing.]

I wish things really were so easy.

The community of composition teachers has long bemoaned

the difficulty students like Carlos have with developing and
arguments.

Evidence for this lies in the

exasperated sighs one hears in faculty meetings and grading
sessions and in the prevalence of chapters on logical
development, or at least on logical fallacies, that appear
in most composition textbooks.

The widespread perception

that entering freshmen, more so than previous generations,

have trouble writing logically, has had an impact on

composition pedagogy.

Starting in the 1970's, a critical

thinking movement has led to the insertion of required
courses in critical thinking for undergraduates; this

movement has percolated down into secondary education as
part of the reforms of the 1980's.

been solved.

But the problem has not

The exposure that high school students get to

logic, reasoning skills or critical thinking varies widely
in content and coherence.

A lucky few may have access to a

course in logic or general philosophy; but in none of the
half-dozen school districts in which I have taught or

observed, nor in the private school where I now teach, does
a high school diploma signify mastery of basic logic.

If

Carlos comes to us knowing what a valid inference is, it is
because a good teacher somewhere thought he ought to know

it.

When we consider that Carlos' popular culture is

profoundly anti-intellectual, and that logic itself is
suspect in some educational circles, it should not surprise
us that he should have trouble negotiating the persuasive
essay assignments that some composition teachers still

require of college freshmen.
Our classes are well-stoGked with Carloses, it seems to

me.

Smart and engaging, they often see themselves aS more

creative than logical, prefer writing journals or poems to

essays, and write "I feel" in situations where convention
would call for "I think;"

They are more comfortable with

narrative or reactive writing than with analytical or

persuasive writing, and as Applebee has noted in the context
of high school, they often fall back on "embedding long
stretches of narrative within a global analytic
frame"-^switching modes inappropriately--to help them

through a difficult assignment (185).

Applebee reports that

high school students are nevertheless "efficient language

learners" (186) who develop coping strategies to see them
through new or difficult writing situations, and voices the
belief that if they lack skill in certain writing

situations, it is probably because they have not been
sufficiently challenged.

I think they've been trained, by

their high school teachers and by other, subtle but powerful
cultural influences, to feel more comfortable with

expressing their feelings than with defending their

opinions.

In other words, in spite of the critical thinking

movement and the sporadic waves Of "refonri" that have swept
over the public schools in California and elsewhere, the
ability of our youth to "think straight," at least as

manifested in their writing, has continued to slip.

I hope that our tutor-ial session?
Carlos; they were a boon to me.

to

His questions, and the

questions they led to, forced me to re-examine the whole
idea of logicV

What is it, really, and what relation does

it have to writing?

Is the study of logic an answer to the

writing problems of our students?

Is logic a method for the

discovery of truth, as Aristotle thought, or is it a
window-dressing for argument, as Carlos suspected?

If the

latter, isn't our insistence on it in a sense hypocritical?
Do we have time to teach logic as part of freshmen

composition, and if so, what part of it do we teach?

Carlos

got me thinking, and in the process gave me a thesis topic;
who can put a value on that?

This paper will look at logic from the standpoint not
of a logician, but of a student and teacher of composition.
The first section will briefly define logic and survey the

fascinating etymology of the term.

Section II will trace,

also briefly, the history of logic as a discipline and
comment on its relationship to composition.

Section III

will examine ways in which authors of composition textbooks

in recent years have attempted to incorporate logical
principles into the teaching of composition.

A fourth

section will examine cultural and intellectual currents that

impact the teaching of composition in the 1990's.

A

conGluding seGtion will look at logie and Gomposition

presGriptively, with particular referehqe to the teaching of
freshmen composition.

The definition of logic offered in 1910 by Walter Skeat
in his Dictionary of the English Language, "the science of

reasoning correctly," while adequate as a starting point,

does not begin to cover cdntetnporary usages, ahd belongs
therefore to a simpler age.

The Oxford English Dictionary

gives six definitipns, documenting occurrences of the word
as far back as Chaucer (1386) and beyond.

Random House

gives pretty much the sairie six, starting with "The science
that investigates the principles governing correct or
reliable inference."

serve our purposes.

As a primary definition, this one will

Though it lacks the august simplicity

of Skeat's, a century of intense philosophical give and take
is embedded in the terms "reliable" and "inference," and in

the implied difference between "reliable" and "correct."

Since I shall argue that our students need to engage this
give and take in order to make sense of higher education,
let alone master its written language, it seems fit to
choose a definition that gives a nod to the advances of our

age.

The nod is more than a passing one.

To say not merely

"the science," but "the science that investigates the

principles goverriihg," is to add. a few removes between the
knower and that which is known. :The word investicrates

especially implies a process, a search for something that

may or may not be found.

"Science," by itself, has a more

static sound to it and seems to suggest a settled system

which, if followed, ensures conclusions that are verifiably
correct.

We have grown to be wary of such conclusions.

Random House continues with "a particular method of

reasoning or argumentation."

It is not surprising, in our

age of relativism, that a word once associated with first
principles has taken on such a markedly relativistic
denotation, or that this denotation has worked its way up to

the number two slot in a major dictionary of the language.
By this definition there can be several, perhaps competing
logics.

The principles or methods subsumed by logic can now

vairy with the situation, or the logician, or both.

It also

allows logic to mean the opposite of "correct or reliable
inference," as in the sentence:

right, but your logic sucks."

campus these days.

"You may think you're

One hears this usage on

The relativistic definition might be

expanded to include not just "methods," which implies
thinking about reasoning, but also the relational patterns,
unconsciously arrived at, that often inform or underlie all

manner of human constructs.

Thus Mina Shaughnessy:
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"...a

teacher who would work with BW students might well begin by-

trying to understand the logic of their mistakes ..." (13).
Logic in such usages is not only relativistic, but heavily
subjective, leading us to ask whether all logic might be, to
a degree, subjective.
yes.

The modern answer is, to a degree,

The subjectivity of logic is an academic debate that

cuts across the disciplines.

Psychology and sociology tell

us that, as individuals and members of groups, we vary quite

a bit on what premises we think important and what methods

we use to proceed from them to form conclusions.

These

considerations have important practical consequences.

"Logic" told George Bush that Iraq wouldn't dare invade
Kuwait; a different "logic" told Saddam Hussein that he

could get away with it.

Logic that doesn't account for

subjectivity is of limited use in human affairs.
The third definition offered by Random House, "The

;

system or principles applicable to any branch of knowledge

or study, i "acknowledges the futility of one of Aristotle's
fondest hopes--that there was a universal system of inquiry
that applied to all disciplines and united all knowledge-

seeking activity.

This is what Aristotle meant by logic,

and he thought he had discovered it.

The definition before

us counterbalances the possibility of a single science of
correct reasoning (definition #1) with the idea that each
discipline, each science, each art (Webster's New World

Dictionary adds art to the list) has its own logic.

Two and

a half millennia of Western scholarship have gradually

institutionalized logic's relatiyity.

Gradually; but our

century has seen a great acceleration of this process, in

spite of attempts, such as Bertrand Russell's with logic and
mathematics and the Vienna Circle's with logical positivism,

to find new grounds for unity.

As academia comes to reflect

more the world'S cuitUraT diversity, it is predictable that
those advocating piluralism will find the idea of a unifying
logic increasingly suspect.
Returning briefly to art, logic is Suspect there, too.
We dichotomize creativity and logic, just as we do right
brain and left, even when the careers of such dual-brained

geniuses as Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) ought to caution
Us against easy generalization.
surprisingly fond of the word.

But critics are
To cite two examples from

the same page of a recent New Yorker: Film critic Terrence
Rafferty refers to the "clear, simple thriller logic" of In
the Line of Fire; his colleague Michael Sragow finds that

"(screenwriter Sydney) Pollack and his team do come up with

a more logical line of action" for The Firm than was present
in John Grisham's "vacuous" book.

A harrative may create

its own premises, but if they are flawed, or if the story

proceeds along lines that reveal internal inconsistencies/
or that contradict the stable assumptions of the critic, a
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work of art may be assailed as illogical.
Definition #4, "Reason gr sound judgment, as in

utterances or actions," is a colloquial offshoot of #1.

It

is to informal logic what #1 is to formal logic; more on
these terms later.

Moving along, "Convincing forcefulness;

inexorable truth or persuasiveness," number 5 in Random

House, seems confusing at first reading.

Which is it, truth

or persuasiveness? :On reflection, we see that it captures
the rhetorical function of logic.

If a condlusion follows,

or seems to follow, from logical principles, it will be more

persuasive than if it does not.

Conversely, the perception

of logical fallacy, whether the perception is fair or not,
will cast doubt on a conclusion that might in fact be true.
The "Carlos" I described above latched quickly onto the idea

that logic is not something we use to reach our conclusions,,
but rather a process that we apply after the fact to
convince others of their truth.

In this idea he has much

historical backing, from the Sophists to modern scholars of

repute, such as Wili Durant, who thought logic too deadly
dull for general readership.

Logic and rhetoric are

sometimes thought of as gpposites, but in concept and in

practice their relationship is complex, and almost surely
predates written language.

Rhetoric is a function of logic;

logic is a part of rhetoric; whether one can be taught apart
from the other is a question that gets to the heart of this

11
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Definition number six in both RH and the OED relates to

the machine I'm staring at now; Webster's expresses it as

"the systemized interconnection of digital switching
functions ..."

This may be a metaphor for what goes on in

the brain when we attempt to be logical.

Logic is hard; the

possibility that computers may take it over is tantalizing.
But with computers as with the syllogism, the major
impediment to logical discovery is not the abstract method,

but its application to the real world.

Too, the logic of

computers depends on the logic of the human beings who
design and program them.

He who would design the chess

program to beat Kasparov must figure out how to beat

Kasparov.

Viewed in this way, one function of the computer

is to capture for the use of the rest of us, more

efficiently than writing ever could for Aristotle, the
advances in logic made by the anonymous geniuses at
Microsoft.

We ought to pause for a moment on this point.

Plato,

.in The Phaedrus. shows Socrates objecting to the new

technology of writing on grounds that fail to convince us
moderns, as they obviously failed to convince Plato--that
reliance on the written word sacrifices the transactional

power of oral communication to assure, or increase the
likelihood of, accurate transmission of ideas, and leads to
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intellectual laziness.

costs.

No doubt/ literaGy has" h

its

Few, perhaps none of today's learned Ph.D.'s could

take on Socrates in oral debate on basic questions, or so I

suspect.

But writing enabled Newton to Stand on the

shoulders of giantSy as well, as preserving the logic of
Aristotle, and writing has at least this advantage over

computers: In order to access the wisdom that writing
preserves, one has to understand what is written.
threaten to do it all for us.

Computers

I read recently of a

programmer who taught his machine to write a romance novel,
After this dubious achievement, it won't be long until

harried undergraduates will be able to punch in a subject

and a point of view, push the print button, and have in hand
an opinion paper of the kind Carlos was struggling with,
perfectly edited, or with just enough logical fallacy and
sentence error programmed in to deflect suspicion.

coming.

It's

The insidious thing about computers is that it puts

power in the user's hands without requiring a modicum of
understanding of the bits and bytes that make the technology
work, much less of its mighty logic, the product of a
million hours of mental labor, retrieved in a micro-second.

Literacy makes readers of the many and authors of the few;
will computers make reasoners of the few, and something
else, something sub-human, out of the rest of us?

13

Webster's traces logic to the Indo-European base leg

meaning to gather, from whence derives the Latin verb
leaere. to collect.

It would be fascinating to know the

precise steps by which gathering became assbciated

linguistically with reasoning.

We may speculate,that the

act of gathering implies discriminating or sorting according
to pre-established categories--green vs ripe, edible vs
npn-edible, ferrous ys non-ferrous.

So during argument, we

gather and sort our data according to whether they
contribute to the point we are making.

To an emerging

civilization at the dawn of literacy, teaching itself the
art of reasoned deba:te, the association between gathering
and reasoning would seem, well, logical.

In any event, 1^

became the Greek logos, moved to Latin as locrica
(reasoning), to French as logigue, and thence to Middle
English as logike (Chaucer's word).

Logos is a big, big word in ancient Greek texts.

translation appears to be problematic.

Its

Webster's gives "a

word, reckoning, thought," but this range doesn't begin to

cover the ground for modern translators of the classics.
Terence Irwin, translating The Gorgias. renders the word as

"speech," "argument," "account", "rational account,"
"discussion" and "statements," according to Plato's shifting

context

(Irwin, p. 16, 17, 24, 33, 33, and 42,

respectively).

Thus; in one word did the Greeks unify
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speech, thought, reasoning and argument.

Logos has also

journeyed intact, through philosophy and theology, to arrive
in the present as an English noun meaning both "reason,

thought of as ... the controlling principle of the universe
and as being manifested by speech," and "the Word, or
ultimate reality; esp., the creative and sustaining spirit
of God as revealed in Jesus:

John I" (Webster's).

The

heavy and varied freight that Logos has borne over the ages
has made it a convenient vehicle for certain contemporary
thinkers, such as some academic feminists, who use the word

to denote the dominant way of knowing that is logical,

linear, abstract, principled and masculine, and contrast

those qualities with the emotional, recursive, sensual,
practical and feminine.

As a prefix, logo- relates to words

or speech, as in logorrhea:

"excessive talkativeness, esp.

when incoherent and uncontrollable," a malady that afflicts

many of us from time to time (Webster's).
also derives from logos.

The suffix -logy

Thus, the root logos contains

within it the concepts pf human speech, reasoned argument,

the origin of the universe, a unifying method of inquiry,
the distinctive methodology of each science, a large part of

rhetoric, Jesus Christ, gender differences, and the inner
workings of computers.

We may generalize that logos and its

descendants form one of the primary sets of phonemes by
which Western languages have expressed the search for order
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to hold at bay the chaos that presses in upon human life; in
the etymology of logic are inscribed many of the problems
that such a search entails

II

"Aristotle created the science of logic: this is simple

historical fact" (Ferguson 31).

This statement is surely

over-simplified, but it holds up when logic is understood to
mean a formal written system of rules for correct reasoning,
and when proper allowances are made for the fact that the
Organon. as his logical treatises came to be called, did not
arise in a vacuum.

He had help.

It would be useful here to

consider the nature of that help.

The circumstances

surrounding Aristotle's invention of formal logic have
relevance for composition studies.
The cross-fertilization between Greece and Egypt is the

subject of much contemporary scholarship that may someday
make Ferguson's claim for Aristotle less simple.

No

Egyptian logical text has been found that would refute the

claim, but Greece and Egypt had traditions of informal logic
and oral debate that pre-dated Aristotle by several
centuries, at least.

Zeno, writing a century before

Aristotle, had used his famous paradoxes to ridicule the

reliance on logic that he observed in his contemporaries.
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The Sophists had taught the use of informal logic to serve
rhetorical ends; the Socrates of Plato's dialogues took them

to task, in The Phaedrus and elsewhere, for specious

reasoning.

By the time Aristotle arrived in Athens to study

with Plato, the claims and limitations of informal

logic--the application of reasoning skills to practical

problems of life--had been debated and written about in
depth.

Developments in religion and politics worked in
Aristotle's favor.

The gradual decay of the old religion, a

cause for anguished debate and social unrest, meant that new

explanations had to be found fpr natural phenomena, opening
the door for science.

Scientific advances in their turn

further discredited the old religion, but not without

resistance, so that scientists arid philosophers had to argue

their positions constantly, not only among themselves, but

vis-a-vis a threatened lay public.

The limited democracy

practiced by citizens of the Greek polis put a premium on
rhetorical skills.

Logic is a large part of persuasion,

becoming ever larger as a discourse community becomes more
sophisticated, more attentive to fallacy and more demanding
of proof.

In the political climate of 4th century B.C.

Athens, logic mattered.

Of course, logic in the service of

rhetoric is a malleable thing.

In such a situation, people

inevitably would be interested in a formalized logic that
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could inform rhetoric and guard against its abuses.

The

demand for formal logic surely predated its existence.

The

table was set for Aristotle.

To the influences of informal logic, religion (or, its

decline), politics, philosophy and science as it then
existed, we must certainly add mathematics.
sense, the Greeks invented mathematics, too.

this shouldn't surprise us.

In an important
In retrospect,

The relationship between logic

and mathematics has been speculated upon by many

philosophers throughout history, and finally demonstrated in
this century by Russell and Whitehead.

Of course, numbers

and counting and basic arithmetic existed before the Greeks

in many places, including Egypt and Mesopotamia.

But as the

Britannica expresses it, "... what was distinctive of the
Greeks' contribution to mathematics--and what in effect made

them the creators of 'mathematics' as the term is usually

understood--was its development as a theoretical discipline.
This means two things: mathematical statements are general,

and they are confirmed by proof" (vol. 23, p. 607).

These

are both attributes of Aristotelian logic, and the influence

of mathematics on Aristotle was certainly considerable.
Plato was his teacher; Plato's friend Theactatus was one of

the first to gaze through the shrinking interstices that

separate integers and fractions, and glimpse the vast
Pacific of irrational numbers.
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More to Aristotle's direct

benefit was the use of variables to replace numbers in

geometric formulae and other math applications,
adapted this practice to formal logic.

Aristotle

The use of letters

to represent terTns and propositions is a qua:ntum leap whose

simplicity should not obscure its importance, for it enabled
logic to free itself of specific questions and become

"general."

Of course, this freeing of logic from specific

questions makes problematic the applicatipn of the general
or formal system back to the real world.

It is the problem

of application that, has drawn the most criticism to formal

logic.

But suspending such criticism for the moment, the

use of symbols to replace specific terms or propositions,
,and the operations to be conducted among them, was as

integral to the development of formal logic as variables
were to theoretical inath.

reliability.

Aristotle was aiming for

The system he sought was one in which

arguments were to proceed reliably from premises to
conclusion, so that if the premises were true, the
conclusion would have to be true.

Math was the model for

his logic, and the use of symbols, in addition to being
convenient, was part of the conceptual framework.

In no other known society did conditions so conducive
to the invention of formal logic come together in so happy a

fashion.

But cruder attempts did originate independently

elsewhere.

Chinese scholar Wing-Tsit Chan identifies the
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"Neo-Moists," named after philosopher Mo Tsu and the school

he founded, as haying established a "utilitarian humanism"
with a basis in logic in thd 4th and 3rd centuries B.C.
This school produced a rudimentary formal logic with seven
methods of argumentation and other advances, but never

progressed "beyond the stage of preliminaries, which was
reached in Greece by the Sophists ..." (Britannica. vol. 23

p. 242), and yielded to the anti-intellectual movement of
Chuang Tsu and the Yin-Yang school.

The Ned-Moists had been

rivals of Confucianism, suggesting that the antipathy

between the influence of China's greatest philosopher and
the cause Of formal logic made the emergence of the latter

unlikely in China, even had Chinese philosophy, with its
emphasis on ethics and the solution of human problems, been
more disposed to accept it.

In any event, as Chan expresses

it, "It is unfortunate that this logical movement died

almost in its infancy, and thus deprived China of a

disinterested/ analyticai, and scientific system of
logic..." (Chan, 47).

In India, logic started later and progressed further,

spanning a tradition of twenty centuries according to
historian Sarvepalli: Radhakrishnan.

The Aristotle of India

wgis perhaps Gautama, whose sutras may date as early as the
3rd century B.C.

Before Gautama, a tradition of formal

debate tournaments existed among educated elite in India
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that corresponded roughly to the dialectics of the Sophists.
From this traditioh evolved several schools of logic, most

notable the Nyaya.

Logic flourishsd in the first few

centuries A.D., becoming one of five subjects that made up a

"pentivium" of classical Hindu education:

Kavya

(literature), Nataka (drama), Alamkara (rhetoric), Tarka

(logic), and Vyakarana (grammar) (Radhakrishnan 32).

Not

all of the ancient Hindu texts have been translated into

Western languages, but as far as we know, the formal logic
that developed independently in India didn't progress much
further than the Chinese version.

"Compared with the logic

of the ancient Greeks, Indian logic is not very impressive"
(Britannica, vol. 23, 241).

It's possible, maybe, that at some time and place,

formal logic occurred in a pre-literate society and died
before it could be written down, but it seems doubtful.
Reason itself is a universal human attribute, but a formal

logic approaching in complexity:even a single book of
Aristotle's must be read, in depth and at some leisure, to
be assimilated; and written down, I suppose, in order to be

composed in the first place.

inadequacy here.

I'm generalizing from my own

There probably are geniuses somewhere in

the world who could keep it all in their heads, just as

there are grand masters who conduct simultaneous blindfold
exhibitions in chess.

But who, without a board and pieces.
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could invent chess enti

whom would he play?

in his imagination?

And with

Plainly put, formal logic is hard.

Aristotle's main Gontribution to it, the sy-llogism, is said

to comprise only a corner of the expanding terrain of formal

logic, but it quickly becomes complex.

It starts with the

four combinations of two dualities, universal-particular and

positive-negative; constructs from them syllogisms each
consisting of two premises and a conclusion; and further

distinguishes three "figures" that vary according to the
order of the terms.

Each figure has sixteen possible

pairings of premises, making a total of 64 if the fourth
figure, omitted by Aristotle, is included.

This is the

number of squares on the chessboard, and chess does not

exceed in complexity the possible variations of the

syllogism, especially when the enthymeme (a syllogism with
one of the premises made contingent, rather than taken as

true), is introduced.

It would seem impossible to negotiate

one's way through this maze without writing down each step.
Not that scholars haven't tried to commit the thing to

memory.

A 13th century wit named Peter the Spaniard

■

"devised a barbaric mnemonic in doggerel Latin displaying
all of the moods" [combinations of the dualities] that form

valid patterns, starting with BARBARA, which caught on, so
that BARBARA became the name of the first mood.

37)

(Ferguson

(The A's represent the universal positive term, i.e..
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all cats are mammals). But BARBARA depended upon written

symbols keyed to a written text.

Giving all the respect

that is due the memory capacity of pre-literate bards, scops

and holy men, it's hard to imagine formal logic existing
without writing.

The Greek phonetic alphabet, in existence

for perhaps six centuries before Aristotle, was a logical
tool of huge importance.

Ayer, in a radio debate with

Father Copleston about logical positivism, suggested that
"the belief of Western philosophers in substance was verf

much bound up with the subject-predicate form of most
sentences in Western languages" (Ayer, Meaning, 35).

The

belief in substance, one might add, gave Western

philosophers the confidence in sensory perception to assert
first principles upon which science, or logic, could build.
The question of whether language creates the world view of a
culture or merely reflects it is peripheral to this paper,
but either way, the structure of the Greek language,

including its written alphabet, gave Aristotle an edge over
Mo Tsu and his followers in China.

All of this suggests to me that the relationship
between logic and composition is less one-sided than I was

used to thinking, before researching this paper.

The

importance of logic to writing has generally been taken as

given, although there has been much disagreement as to the
degree and nature of that importance.
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Most contemporary

critics of logic-based pedagogy don't claim that logic has

no value, Pb advocate that writing hot be logical•

Rather,

they may propose with Miter, that instructors give more

emphasis to autobiographical writing, or with Acevedo, that

professors pay more heed to the affective side of their
students, not to oppose logic per se but to correct ;

perceived imbalances in the pedagogy, or in the way it's
delivered.

The assumption, inherited from antiquity and the

Middle Ages and held by many educators up to recent times,
that the study of formal logic sharpens the mind and leads
to better writing, is no longer widely held, judging from
current educational practices; but informal logic,

supposedly schooled by formal logic but adapted to the "real
world," is still an integral part of the writing curriculum.

Logic is important to writing.

Our emphasis on thesis

statements, paragraph organization, transitional statements,

supporting evidence, etc.. proclaims our belief that this is
true.

Conversely, Writing is important to logic, not in the

abstract sense, but certainly in the practical.

If the idea

of formal logic is valid, its validity doesn't depend on

human expression, written or otherwise.

But for logic to

exist, in a form accessible to humans, it must be written

down.

It requires a sophisticated literacy to be understood

and built upon.

It requires composition.

The relationship

between logic and composition is thus a kind of symbiosis.
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Formal logic needs composition in order to exist in the

world; composition requires formal logic, or at least
principles derived from it, in order to achieve coherence,
not to mention persuasiveness in most rhetorical situations.
It would be hard to teach one without teaching some elements
of the other.

Aristotelian logic barely survived antiquity, and
advanced but little through the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance.

Most or all of Aristotle's work was translated

into Latin, but only apart of it survived the collapse of

Rome and passed directly into Christian Europe.
texts fared better than most.

The logical

Several of them in Greek were

available to Boethius as he awaited his execution in 524.

While in prison he translated them to Latin and added his
own commentary, in the process making "a powerful
contribution to the creation of a Latin vocabulary of

logical terms" (Copleston 54).

Apparently perceiving a

relationship between logic and composition theory such as it
then existed, "he transmitted to the medievals the

distinction, attributed by Porphyry to the Peripatetics,
between written, spoken and mental discourse ..."

(54).

Deprived of most of the Aristotle corpus, the Christian
scholars of the Middle Ages knew Aristotle primarily as a

logician.

Boethius' pupil Cassiodorus divided up the seven

liberal arts (compiled earlier by the pagan scholar
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Martianus Capella) into the Trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and
logic, or dialectic) and the Quadrivium (arithmetic,

geometry, music and astronomy).

These two courses of study

"formed the basis of medieval education" (56) for young

scholars who aspired to the higher calling of theology.

Theology had an anesthetizing effect on philosophical

speculation during the first Christian millennium.
Christianity purports to explain the crea.tioh of the
universe, stipulates ethical conduct, and answers all

questions about the purpose of life (the soul's salvation).
It's effect on logic was not so drastic as we might expect,
given the modern tendency to see reason and faith as

contrary impulses.

In a theocratic society, reason must be

subordinated to revealed truth, so logic as a means of

discovering truth is out.

Logic may serve as a handmaiden

to theology, though--and it did.
familiar one for logic.

The handmaiden role was a

Orgarion means a tool or implement,

and logic had been conceived as a tool by Aristotle.

No

intellectual tool was ever worked harder than logic during

the Middle Ages.

Doctrihe supplied for Christian Europe a

new set of first principles, some of which (Virgin Birth,
Resurrection, transubstantiation of sacramental bread and

wine) departed radically from ordinary human experience.

A

logic that could make plausible such apparently fanciful
phenomena would be usefiil indeed to the Church.
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Of course.

a logic that proceeded from first principles derived not
from doctrine but from tangible reality would be intolerably

threatening to institutionalized religion.

Theology

encouraged logic as a subordinate discipline while keeping a
wary eye on its subversive possibilities.
What Christian who ever doubted has not turned at one

time or another to reason to prove the existence of God, or

to explain the presence of evil in a world created by a God
who so loved the world that he ...?

Medieval proofs of

God's existence became increasingly popular and arcane, and

not just among doubters.

A believer who takes Christian

doctrine as beyond doubt but still possesses intellectual
curiosity, and there seem to have been many such, might wish
to investigate the nature of his faith, and employ logic as
a tool in that enterprise.

Copleston chronicles the

attempts of a diverse succession of medieval theologians to
do just that, starting with Anselm and Abelard in the 11th
century.

Some wrote in the Platonic tradition, which in

12th century Chartes, for example, meant deriving their

cosmology from Plato's Timaeus, and (referring to William of
Conches) "[identifying] the world-soul of the Timaeus with

the Holy Spirit" (88).

Others, such as John of Salisbury,

used Aristotelian logic as a touchstone.

Whatever their

orientation or methods, these writers sought to reconcile
faith and reason.

By this enterprise, they sought
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simultaneously to reGoncile Christian doctrine with the
wisdom of antiquity and to fend off challenges to their
faith from the outside.

Islam in particular was a persistent and formidable
challenge to Christianity, and the medieval theologians were
spurted on by competition with their Moslem counterparts,

and by the evangelical imperative of their faith.

To rely

upon Christian doctrine was an idle exercise in the face Of
Islam's own revealed truth, but if Christianity could be

shown to have the stronger logical base, conversion might be

possible.

Copleston cites the De arte fidei catholicae. a

12th century work probably by Alan of Lille (but perhaps by
Nicolas of Amiens), as an example of an attempt to

rationalize Christianity.

Alan's approach was to "exhibit

theology as a deductive science, based on self-evident
principles" (103).

In doing so he was being self-

consciously Aristotelian.
ace.

Ironically, Islam played the same

Aristotle had a mighty influence on Islamic philosophy

of the same period.

His works had been translated from

Greek into Syrian at schools in Mesopotamia, Persia and

Syria around the time of Boethius, and into Arabic in the
8th century.

Thus Aristotle was available to Islamic

thinkers from Mohammed's time onward.

At least two major

works by Plotinus and PrOclus were erroneously attributed to

Aristotle by the Arab translators, giving a curious

28

Neo-Platonic flavor to the "Aristotle" studied in Arabia.

Nevertheless, for several centuries, "... scientific studies
flourished in the Islamic world at a time when such Studies

in the Christian West were in a much more rudimentary state"

(107).

Spanish-born Ibn-Rushd (11267-1198?), known as

Averroes to the Christian world, "looked on Aristotle's

genius as the culmination of human intellectual activity"

(118).

Jewish philosophy of the period was influenced by

the Greeks as well, with Aristotle gradually eclipsing Plato

as the strongest light.

Copleston identifies MaimonideS

(1135-1204) as the foremost Jewish philosopher of the Middle

Ages.

Born in the same city (Cordoba) as Averroes at about

the same time, Maimonides, in proving the existence of God,

used Aristotelian arguments. ; Christian, Islamic and Jewish
philosophers worked, of course, from different premises, but
shared their approach of borrowing from logic to prove
religious truths.

Logic did not die during the Middle Ages;

it shuffled through the period as the servant of theology.
Aristotle's stature continued to grow as more of his

literary corpus became known through Moslem sources,* he was
now The Philosopher.

Aristotelian logic in Christian Europe

expanded to accommodate those books of the Oraanon that were

not available to Boethius.

Rog;er Bacon in England and Ramon

Lull in Spain represent two directions within the Franciscan
order as the "new" logic was digested.
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The former became

interested in empirical approaches tp science and advocated

experimental confirmation of scientific truth reached
through reason.

Lull, devoting his long life to the

conversion of Moslems, made advances in logic that were

obscured over the years by the fact that he wrote mostly in
Arabic and Catalun.

He used letters to represent terms and

concepts, and described "mechanical devices, with concentric
and rotating circles or discs, which would enable people to

see the various possible combinations of the basic [logical]

concepts" (174).

This sounds like the circle diagrams of

modern logic texts.

Copleston goes on to chronicle the

contributions of Acquinas, Duns Scotus and William of
Ockham, among others, but from the perspective of today,
medieval philosophers added little to pure logical theory,
although the use they made of what they had inherited could
often be dazzling.

Why mention medieval logic at all?

One answer is

implicit in Copleston's description of Duns Scotus, whom he
clearly admires.
scholasticism.

It concerns particularly the idea of

As Copleston notes, we tend to think of the

medievals as "dealing with arid abstractions and developing
closely reasoned but involved logical arguments, subtle no
doubt but pedantic ... redolent of the academic world of
classrooms and formal disputations" (213).

In a way, this

image of monks quarreling over pin-dancing angels does for
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us, by accident, what Zeno was trying to do for his
contemporaries a century before Aristotle.
reason.

It ridicules logic.

It debunks

It works against the

acceptance of logic by today's secular society.

The

proportion of people who hold Christian beliefs as revealed

first principles has dwindled to a small percentage in the
nominally Christian countries of the West, including the
United States.

Not sharing the first premises of theology,

we find naive or irrelevant the conclusions to which logic
directed the medievals, and therefore suspect the process

that got them there.
world view.

Science is the primary model of our

We trust science, even when we don't understand

it, as the medievals did God.

We don't trust logic,

especially the formal Aristotelian kind.

antiquarian feel to it.

It has a heavy,

Alternatively, it's a game like

chess, fun perhaps for those who have the patience for it,
but not relevant to our lives.

To many, formal logic seems

both heavy and frivolous, difficult but not worth the
bother.

Our association of it with medieval scholasticism

contributes to this reaction.

We may see in the etymology

of the word trivial the low value we have come to place on

the subjects of the triyium.

I

We think of the Renaissance as a re-birth of classical

learning, but this view doesn't apply well to logic.

As we

have seen, the entirety of the Organon was available to the
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late medieval thinkers, who tended to elevate Aristotle to a

high pedestal as the pure embodiment of pre-Christian

philosophy.

The Renaissance took him down a few pegs,

especially outside Italy and among those interested in
practicing, or at least philosophizing about, science.
Francis Bacon, for example, thought he saw the fallacies
which had led medieval thinkers astray.

Specifically, he

distrusted human perception, questioned our tendency to

generalize from our own quirky experience and education,
recognized the instability of language; and inyeighed
against the deference paid to very did and very dead
philosophers.

Aristotle, for instance.

Bacon's advocacy of

experimental science based on his inductive method helped
kick off the scientific revolution.

AS Minard asserts,

Francis Bacon was more of a linguist and rhetorician than a
scientist and logician, but his influence on science was

■■ '■' ■
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substantial.
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Eiseley contends that Bacon forced a

backward-looking Renaissance England "to swallow,

figuratively, a pill--the pill of science ..." (Eiseley 20).
Bacon also helped assure that Aristotle would be
associated more with formal logic than with the scientific
method.

As the natural sciences (and later, the social

sciences) expanded, they appropriated inductive reasoning
for themselyes; leaving to logic only deductive reasoning.
The latter makes the more powerful claim--that its
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conclusions follow with certainty from true premises.
Inductive reasoning claims only near-certainty, or

probability.

But induction, neglected while theology ruled

philosophy, opened up new methods for the budding natural
sciences.

The science of Newton and Descarte supplanted

logic and metaphysical speculation as ways of making
knowledge.

Academic departments based on induction

multiplied; logic and philosophy shrank.
formal logic, Aristotle lost stature.

As the inventor of

This was somewhat

unfair to Aristotle, whose own science was more inductive
than deductive.

Tme, he made claims for logic that seem

absurd in a scientific context.

He thought that a

scientific discovery is verified when it can be made the

conclusion of a syllogism, or series of syllogisms.

Ackrill

allows that "the notion that scientists occupy themselves in

expounding demonstrative syllogisms based on definitions is
indeed laughable" (98).

Ackrill goes on, though, to suggest

that in describing a science of demonstrative syllogisms,
Aristotle was not advocating a practical method, but

depicting an ideal or "finished" science.

There hovers over

Ackrill's discussion of Aristotelian science the cloud of a

great historical misunderstanding, resulting in an
"Aristotelianism" that distorted the totality of the great
man's thinking.

Bacon sought to break the grip that "the

sterile logic of the Aristotelian school men" had on his
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scholarship has

rehabilitated Adristotle who, it is noted, with his helpers

collected and analyzed all the natural stuff they could get

their hands on, classifying nature according to observed

characteristics.

But the perception of his science as

absurdly theoretical persists.

So the paradigm shifted gradually from Christianity and
a disembodied Aristotelianism to the rationalism of the

Enlightenment and the empiricism of modern science, leaving
Aristotle momentarily behind.

But the scientific revolution

left open some of the questions it had raised.

What, for

example, was the true relationship between deduction and
induction?

The working out of this question must

necessarily re-involve Aristotle, whose science contained
elements of both. ■ An epic attempt at synthesis was
performed by John Stuart Mill in 19th century England.

His

Logic comprised six books and underwent many revisions and

eight publications during his lifetime (August 95).

Part of

Mill's genius lay in the ability to find disarmingly simple
solutions to old questions.

He pointed out that even

deductive syllogisms arrive at their first (major) premises

inductively.

The premise "all men are mortal" is not a

deduction, but an inference that rests upon millions of
cases.

Mill "... established a working relationship between

the two kinds of logic" (August 98).
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The vindication of

Aristotle inscribed in Mill's solution is also contained in

the quotation from Einstein with which August prefaces the

chapter on Mill's logic:

"The supreme task of the physicist

is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which

the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction" (August 89).
Modern science relies upon induction rather than naus
(intuitive reason) to establish first premises, but often

proceeds deductively towards its conclusions.

Naus and

induction are, it seems to me, related psychologically.

Naus is probably guesswork informed by experience.

Bacon's

breakthrough would seem to be his attempt to systematize
naus.

After him, scientists replaced guesswork with a

developing system based on induction and probability, which
are now thought to dominate the research methods of the
natural and social sciences.

To take it further. Mill describes the method by which

hypotheses are generated and tested experimentally as a
syllogism with induction supplying one or more of the terms.

We may see the truth in Mill's formulation by considering
Millikan's oil drop experiment, which established the
existence of the elementary unit of electrical charge and

won the 1923 Nobel prize for physics.

The experiment was

the major premise of a syllogism whose middle term might be
expressed in this way:

particles sprayed through an

electronically charged field will fly randomly if there is
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no elementary charge, but in a pattern if such a unit
exists.

The conclusion of the syllogism, that; a unit does

or does not exist, cannot be deductively certain, since the

first premise is empirical obserya:tibn bf: a cohtrived^

experiment, and the second is a theQtetical hypothesis.

But

if the hypothesis makes sense and the experiment
operationalizes the question in a manner thah^^^^r^^

out all

other explanations and achieves replicable results, then the
conclusion may be accepted as true.

The breakthrough

concept is the middle term, the link between observation and
new knowledge.

This framing of the scientific method

recalls Aristotle's conviction that science, in its pure
form, is a search for the elusive middle term (Posterior

Analytics II.2.89b36; see Ackrill 100).

What Aristotle

began to suspect about the connection between deduction and
induction. Mill made explicit, and science confirmed.

: : Up to the time of Mill, formal (deductive) logic had

advanced but little after Aristotle.

Ackrill quotes Kant as

having said that "... since Aristotle, [logic] has not

required to retrace a single step ... to the present day

this logic has not been able to advance a single step, and
is thus to all appearances a closed and completed body of
doctrine" (Ackrill 81).

That was in 1787.

The relationship

between logic and mathematics, remarked on earlier, is

visible in the contributions made by mathematicians to
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formal logic in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Editor William

Bartley introduces Lewis Carroll's Symbolic Logic by

dividing formal logic into three historical periods.

The

Aristotelian period spanned more than two millennia, with
scant change.

Bartley fixes the Boolean or transitional

period from 1847 into the early 20th century.

George Boole,

a contemporary of Mill, got deductive logic moving again
with a system of symbolic logic modeled on algebra, with
applications that reached beyond logic to science and
engineering.

(Electronic calculators use principles of

Boolean algebra to perform arithmetic functions.)

Carroll

himself was a math professor who devoted much of his last
years to the project of making logic fun and accessible to
the masses.

The logicians of the transitional period did

not abandon the syllogism, but put it in a new and reduced

perspective.

Their task was no longer to validate a line of

reasoning by reducing it to a syllogism or series of
syllogisms, but to find the logic inherent in a given set of
premises or conditions (Carroll 15-23).

The third period began with Bertrand Russell's The

Principles of Mathematics (1903).

This book, along with

Russell's later collaborations with Alfred North Whitehead,

sought to demonstrate the unity of mathematics and logic.
We grasp intuitively that math is "logical"; Russell
attempted to show that from the principles of formal logic.
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it is possible to deduce the fundamental principles of math.

In the process, he developed a "propositional calculus" that
extended formal logic beyond the range of nearly everyone

not already defeated by the syllogism or by Boole's algebra.

Building on the work of Russell, and heavily influenced by

the British empiricists, notably Hume, the logical
positivists then took the extreme position that no
proposition is meaningful unless it is subject to empirical
verification.

Logical positivism banished metaphysical

speculation from philosophy, along with ethics and
aesthetics, in so far as judgments cannot be verified by the

senses.

Under Ayer, "philosophy is a department of logic"

(Ayer, Lancruaae. 57).

Logical positivism was attacked from many sides.
George Saritayaha's metaphor for Russell expressed the
humanist objection to the new logic:
mobile and accurate.

"Russell's eye is

It sweeps the universe like an

intensely concentrated searchlight, but it sees only a small

patch at a time ... (absorbed with) the absolutely obvious
and logically certain" (Santayana, Birth, 127).

Durant

averred that the logic of Russell and Whitehead "was as
completely divorced as possible from all experience ..."
(Durant. Mansions. 29).

Karl Popper whimsically took

personal credit for killing logical positivism (Schilpp,

Popper. 69).

Popper wanted to extinguish the growing
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preoccupation of philosophy with linguistic precision, but
the dominance of linguistic issues over contempqrary

philosophy, traceable to the logical positivists, shows that

he was not successful. But philosophy ^
teach ethics, aesthetics and Hegel.

still

There seems to be a

general sense that logical positivism has made its
contributions and run its course.

Of the generation we're now discussing, John Dewey had
the greatest direct impact on American education.

American

pragmatism had obvious roots in British empiricism, but the
key test of a proposition for Dewey was not whether it could
be verified, but whether it worked.

Dewey thought practicai

logic to be a general, intuitive human attribute, like
speech, and that experience would show what principles and
orders of relations were valid within a given subject. ^

referred to a "natural selection" by which different logical

approaches would compete to meet the test of expediehcy.
The example of jurisprudence served to illustrate the

problem of applying logic to human affairs.

approbation Justice Holmes:

He quoted with

"... the whole outline of the

law is the resultant of a conflict at every point between

logic and good sense--the one striving to wOrk fiction out
to consistent results, the other restraining arid at last
overcoming that effort when the results become too

manifestly unjust" (Dewey 130).
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Better to try each case on

V

its merits and invoke logic retroactively to justify the
outcome.

The Pragmatists anticipated logical positivism in

the emphasis on experience and distrust of metaphysics, but

logic for Dewey was not the unifying principle of his
philosophy.

Let's find out what works, he urged, and let

the British worry about consistency.

The fragmented state of logic that we observe in
American education may be said to represent a victory of

pragmatism over logical positivism.

This is ironic because

the logical positivists didn't direct their main attack
against pragmatism, but rather against anything that smacked
of metaphysics.

In this fight Dewey and the Vienna Circle

were distant allies.

Both preferred common sense to

abstract speculation, induction to deduction.

Logical

positivism, had it prevailed, might have been able to
restore to higher education a unifying center to replace
rhetoric, which had enjoyed a central position in the

American university through most of the 19th century.

As

departments of rhetoric were replaced by departments of

English and communications, and the common core of rhetoric

and the classics by the new elective curriculum,
undergraduate education lost its center.

The logical

positivists sought to elevate a unified and sophisticated
logic to the position once held by rhetoric, in the process

restoring a degree of unity.

But the centrifugal power of
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pragmatism proved too great.

The "whatever works" approach

freed each new department to discover its own "logic," its

own rules for making knowledge.

Also, the relativist bias

of our age is as hostile to the idea of logic as it is
sympathetic to pragmatism.

In any event, the appeal of

pragmatism slowly exploded the notion of a unifying logic.
The shards from this explosion lie scattered throughout

the academy.

Formal or deductive logic is sometimes still

said to be the property of philosophy departments, while
induction belongs to the natural and social sciences.

But

after Mill, this formulation is conceptually obsolete.

"Formal logic" has also come to mean exalted academic logic,
both deductive and inductive, as distinct from informal

logic, the practical kind that gets the hay down to where

most of us goats can get it.

Informal logic is what the

Greeks meant by locros before Aristotle came along.

We

encounter it today in writing classes, critical thinking
classes, speech and debate, and indeed, in logic courses,
where the textbooks of such "informal" logicians as Toulmin,

Quine, Beardsley and Kahane have largely supplanted the

study of formal logic.

Psychology, as it investigates

cognition, attempts to account for logical ways of thinking.
Natural sciences teach the scientific method; social

sciences, research design and statistics; and math

departments, advanced probability theory.
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Logic is

everywhere in academia.

However, only students who take

upper-division courses in logic from vestigial philosophy

departments are likely to be taught the subject in h
systematic way.

Most American students know a little of

Aristotle, but of the syllogism, perhaps only BARBARA.

Each

discipline teaches that portion of logic that it deems

necessary for its own purposes.

Regarding the task of

assembling the fragments into a coherent whole, today's
students are, to an extent I find distressing, on their own.

Ill

Despite the close kinship between logic and rhetoric,
we cannot accurately say that they followed parallel courses
in the evolution of American education

True, the influence

of British thinkers dominated American practice until well

into the 19th century for rhetoric, and well into the 20th

for logic.

But aside from the British connection, the two

disciplines moved on separate tracks, only occasionally
crossing each other at stations along the way.

As we have

seen, after two millennia of stasis, logic grew

exponentially from the time of Mill and Boole. The competing
claims of deduction and induction were reconciled, new

avenues of inquiry were opened up, and a relatively small
number of obsessed geniuses, led by Russell and Whitehead,
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built up the struGture of contemporary logic.

By

comparison, the history of rhetoric is a mess, a cacophony
of many voices, a mad attic of swinging pendulums and

revolving carousels, a twisted skein of theory and practice
whose varied threads are truncated only to appear again,
decades later, intertwined with other threads in new
combinations.

This discrepancy between the recent histories of
rhetoric and logic is predictable and healthy.

Logic is a

permanent, pre-existing system of relations that awaits
discovery, or so logicians might have it; one would expect

its development to be cumulative, like math.

Rhetoric,

according to the very oldest and the very newest theory, is
transactional, a negotiation of meaning achieved by the

interplay of rhetor, audience, object (subject matter), and
language, to be used in areas where logic or science or

sensual experience are unable to determine truth.

Aristotle

thought the domain of rhetoric to be the public arena of
law, politics, and similar situations where persuasion is
called for, but proof not possible.
rhetoric is much greater.

For some, the domain of

There is a new transactional

rhetoric, which Berlin identifies as "epistemic," that

"exists not merely so that truth may be communicated [but]
so that truth may be discovered."

Since "knowledge itself

is a rhetorical construct" (Berlin, 20th. 165), the domain
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of rhetoric is all-inclusive. On the other extreme, social

scientists who attempt to employ the methods of natural

science, math and logic to human relations may operate from

epistemological assumptidns more positivistic than
Aristotle's, and would narrow the terrain that rhetoric is

free to negotiate.

As Berlin points out, the variable here

appears to be epistemology.

As he puts it, "Every

rhetoric...is grounded in a noetic field: a closed system
defining what can, and cannot, be known; the nature of the

knower; the nature Of the relationship between the knower,
the known, and the audience; and the nature of language"

(19th. 2).

Berlin goes on to acknowledge that in a

pluralistic democracy as large as the United States, it is
unlikely that one noetic field, or one rhetoric, will
dominate (although one rhetoric, the "current-traditional"
one, dominated college writing instruction fob nearly a

century, and still informs the practice of most [according
to Berlin; I would say "many"] English teachers in American
secondary schools).

There has been no American rhetoric,

bnt bather, many American rhetorics, which have varied

hugely in the treatment and importance given to logic.
Berlin uses two different but related taxonomies to

help unravel the skein, one for the 19th century and one for
the 20th. His two-volume overview does not discuss the

details of how logic has been incorporated into American
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writing iristruction, but is informed by a tritical reading
of dozens of rlietdninal tfeatises and textbboks>

His

taxonomies and comments are thus pertinent to our discussion

of logic.

American departments of rhetoric lagged their

British cbuntetparts by several deca.des, so that as Berlin
picks up the story at the end of the Revolution, the
classical rhetoric that prevailed in America gave;way

the

19th century to a psychological or "18th Century" rhetoric
based on Scottish Common Sense Realism (hereafter SCSR).

summarize:

To

Classical rhetoric, descending from Aristotle,

Cicero and Quintilian, occupied the central position in

American higher education at the time of the Revolution.

It

was a time-honored, comprehensive system that accounted for

every step of the composing process.

It had a rational base

in the deductive logic of Aristotle, but valued emotional
and ethical persuasion in their proper spheres, and
accommodated the audience, in that the task of the rhetor

was to find the available means of persuasion according to

the sophistication of the audience, its receptiveness to the
rhetor's message, etc.

John Quincy Adams, ensconced in the

Boylston Chair of Rhetoric at Harvard for a few years in
between stints as legislator and diplomat, assembled his
lectures into an elegant statement of the classical ,

position.

Published in 1810 to the utter indifference of

the civilized world. Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratorv
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presented "nine lectures on inyention, eight on arrangement,
ten on style, one on delivery, and even one on memory"

(Berlin, 19th, 15).

The rational basis of Adams' rhetoric

is clearly stated, as is its affinity to the separate

discipline of logic:

"VThe connexion between genuine

rhetoric and sound logic is indeed indissoluble.

All good

speaking must necessarily rest upon the basis of accurate
thinkingi' He goes on to argue that logic and rhetoric must
be separated, but that they are closely related:

''logic to

the Operations of the mind, within itself; rhetoric to the
communication of their results to the minds of others.
' in

this view, 'logic is the store house, from which the
instruments Of rhetoric are to be drawn'" (19th. 16).

Berlin finds much to admire in the classical approach,

including the observation that its professors were dedicated

to the teaching of undergraduates.

But Lectures was already

obsolete by the time it was published.

In explaining the demise of classical rhetoric, Berlin
notes that its association with England tended to discredit

it in post-revolutionary America, which was struggling to
establish a system of education, not to mention a
literature, that was suited to and reflective of the

American experience.

But it was more than that. Adams'

rhetoric suffered, unjustly, from the association with
Aristotle, and here we see an American replication of the
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"great historical misunderstanding" alluded to above in
connection with Francis Bacon and the Enlightenment thinkers
who followed,

19th Centu^^y America conducted the same

rebellion against deductive reasoning and in favor of
induction that the British empiricists had a centuryearlier.

"And in overthrowing Aristotelian logic, the age

discarded Aristotelian rhetoric as well, if only for its

association with the deductive method" (l£th, 17).

George

Campbell, one of the architects of the "18th century
rhetoric" that defined American rhetoric in the 19th

century, went so far as to deny the validity of deductive
reasoning in either logic b^r rhetoric.

This anti-Aristotle

bias may have had political motives. Aristotelian rhetoric,
in so fat as it does privilege deductive reasoning, is

inherently conservative, since it proceeds from existing
knowledge to find new truth, rather than relying upon
empirical observation, which might refute existing knowledge
altogether.

Glassicalrhetdtic's association with the

aristocratic English university made it politically
incorrect in the age of expanding American democracy.
Adams' rhetoric drowned in the same rising tide that swamped

the sixth president himself in the election of 1828, the

"Jackson" in this case being the rhetoric of Campbell, Hugh
Blair and Richard Whately.

These three propdnents of SCSR dominated American
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rhetpric up to the Civil War, when their American disciples,
such as Samuel P. Newman and Henry Day, took over.

Newman

followed the belletristic approach of Blair; Day built upon
the "faculty psychology" of SCSR, following Campbell.

Each

of these authors differed from the others on some points,

and spawned proteges who also had their differences.

But in

broad outline, as Berlin schemes it out, these "18th

century" rhetoricians produced a mechanistic and reductive
rhetoric whose direct descendent, the "current-traditional"

rhetoric, held sway until the 1960's. Berlin doesn't mention
Boole, but we may note that 18th Century rhetoric was not
informed by the new Boolean logic, which developed

independently of current rhetorical theory.

Logic and

rhetoric, so closely united in Adams' work, were now split
apart, and remain split to this day.
In what ways were these 18th century rhetorics
"reductive"? Although based on the probable conclusions of
induction, their proponents entertained a markedly

positivistic epistemology derived from SCSR and its "faculty

psychology."

SCSR posited two corresponding realities, the

material and the spiritual.

Human beings are born with

certain "faculties" that enable us to perceive truth in both

of these areas, if we open up our faculties to receive it.

It's up to the individual to seek truth by developing and

freeing the intellect, reason, intuition, etc., in an
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environment uncontaminated by the mediation of other
thinkers.

This done, the seeker may become rhetor by so

arranging his speech or writing as to re-create the truth in
the minds of listeners or readers.

factor out the social context.

This rhetoric tends to

Since truth is apprehended

first by the rhetor, he knows what he wants to say, and so
invention disappears from rhetoric, or takes on a new

definition, namely arrangement.
transacted, but conveyed.

Truth is not negotiated or

The rhetor adapts his message to

his audience, which remains a passive recipient.

18th

century rhetoric elevated speech above writing, because

speech engages more faculties in both sender and receiver.
In this, it anticipated the romantic rhetoric of Emerson.
Nineteenth century America was not yet democratic, and
neither was its rhetoric.

The American university at

mid-century was administered mostly by clerics and served,

mostly, the aristocracy.

However, after the Civil War, a

radically changed economy, an emerging middle class with
college aspirations for its children, and the spread of free

public education through high school, together with other
forces nearly as wrenching, wrought great changes within the
academy.

It would not be unreasonable to expect, under such

conditions, a major paradigm shift in rhetoric.

The third

category in Berlin's 19th century taxonomy, romantic
rhetoric, would have accomplished such a shift, had it
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succeeded.

Based on the speech and writing of Emerson and

other Transcendentalists, "romantic rhetoric" may strike us

at first as an oxymoron:

since Romanticism glorified the

individual and the need for self-expression, of what use is

the art of persuasion?

Indeed, one common interpretation of

Emerson is that his individualism and preoccupation with

spiritual reality, or the "oyersoul," precluded him from
considering a transactional rhetoric.

A rhetoric based on

this interpretation would be Platonic rather than
Aristotelian, and would lead to a composition pedagogy that

emphasizes the removal of barriers to self-expression.

As

with "18th century" rhetoric, the role of the audience as a
partner in the making of knowledge disappears.

The

difference is that the focus shifts not to transmission of

effect, but to the authenticity of the rhetor's voice.

Recent composition textbooks by Macrorie, Coles, Stewart and
others have worked this "rhetorical vein" (Berlin, 19th,

45).

But there is a different reading of Emerson that

produces a much more comprehensive rhetoric.

Emerson,

although he sought a faculty chair in rhetoric, never

compiled his thoughts on rhetoric into a single treatise on
the subject, and his writings allow for conflicting

interpretations.

But remembering his dictum on foolish

consistency, we may extract from Emerson a comprehensive
rhetoric tailored to the needs of emerging American
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fiirierson

idealist in love with self-reliance, and

one of his ongoing concerns was the recohciliaticn of
philosbphical idealism with democratic politics.
Transcendentaiism shared with SGSR the dualism of material

and spiritual reality, :But under Emerson; the dour
Presbyterian outlook of SCSR became an enthusiastic love of
nature.

The external world was sacred for Emerson not just

because God created it, but because its reality corresponded

in some organic way to a higher spiritual realm, so that
understanding nature is a pathway to understanding the
divine.

Since language is grounded in the external world,

it may express through metaphor the deep, transcendent truth
that makes the rhetor valuable and necessary especially in a

democracy.

Emerson's rhetoric derived its energy from the

value that democracy places upon resolving problems by
discussion and debate. In America, rhetoric mattered, and

every citizen should be motivated to hone his rhetorical
skills to the level of eloquence:

If there ever was a country where eloquence was a

power, it is the United States. Here is room for
every degree of it, on every one of its ascending
stages...Is it not worth the ambition of every
generous youth to train and arm his mind with all
the resources of knowledge, of method, of grace and
of character, to serve such a constituency (20th.

Metaphor is no mere embellishment nor, as with Plato, the

"exceptional province of the philosopher" (48).

It is the

universal language of truth.

Nor should the orator's

diction and syntax be confined to polite speech.

Rather, he

"must command the whole scale of hhe language, from the most

elegant to the most low and vile" (52).

Emerson's

democratic rhetoric made the common man into a poet, and the
elite orator into a verbal street fighter.

Here was a rhetoric for an emerging democracy.

But in

spite of Emerson's popularity, his rhetoric never quite took
hold.

Composition textbooks informed by Emersonian rhetoric

did appear later in the century.

Fred Newton Scott, a

colleague of John Dewey who was himself an admirer of
Emerson, published (along with Joseph Villiers Denney and
Gertrude Buck) a series of textbooks that presented an

alternative to prevailing practice.

But romantic rhetoric

lost out to the "current-traditional" school. Berlin locates

the reason for this in the politics of the academy and of

the larger society in which it nested.

The egalitarian

strain in American culture did not yet prevail over the

totalitarian.

Emerging democracy aside, America was still a

top-down society.

By choosing a sender-receiver model of

rhetoric over a self-expressive one (and passing Emerson

over for the elusive professorship of rhetoric), college
administrators were responding to a market demand for
communication and correctness--for graduates who could

function in a corporate environment. After all, in spite of
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being endowed with an egalitarian political theory and

entrusted by history with the chalice of democracy, America
has remained a conservative society through most of its

history-

America was not "ready" for Emerson in the 19th

century, and may not yet be.

The fate of romantic rhetoric

may be seen as a demonstration that America's love affairs
with its radical thinkers tend not to be consummated by

permanent union.
The various nineteenth century rhetorics that replaced

the classical assigned a low value to deductive logic.

Eighteenth century rhetoric explicitly set itself in
opposition to Aristotle. Emerson glorified reason, but it
was an instinctive reason grounded in metaphor rather than
logic.

Moreover, as the century waned, the college

curriculum changed in:ways tldiat were hostile to both logic
and rhetoric-

Under the new elective system pioneered at

Harvard, the required course in rhetoric shrank from three

years to One, and there; was considerable pressure around the
turn of the century to eliminate the freshman rhetoric

/

course entirely. The new English departments made literary

studies their new centerpiece, relegating rhetoric, once the
heart of the under-grad-uate curriculum, to low-status drudge

work.

Logic lost prestige along with rhetoric, so that the

proportion of students who actually studied logic decreased
during the era of logic's greatest growth since the death of
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Aristotle.

For the 20th century, Berlin employs a new

three-slotted taxonomy; rhetorics are seen to be objective,

subjective or transactional, according to the underlying
epistemology.

Objective theories include most notably the

"current-traditional" rhetoric, whose most influential

proponents at the turn of the century were A.S. Hill and
Barrett Wendell of Harvard, and John Genung of Amherst.

In

the letter's hands, rhetorical study "abandoned concern for

the ethical as it became completely positivistic in intent."

The composition taught in classes guided by this rhetoric
tended to focus on discourse "conceived exclusively in

empirical and rational teinns" (Berlin, 20th, 8).

Emotional,

ethical and aesthetic considerations were subordinated to

unity and correctness and precision of language.

JoAnn

Campbell's review of English A at Radcliffe finds the old

professors to have been afraid of intimacy and the objects
of frustrated covert criticism by some of their students:
"Wendell conceived of the classroom as a combative arena and

believed that an important element of education--vigorous

contest--disappeared when women were taught alongside men"

(Campbell 478).

This was rhetoric in the service of

science, men's work, and it clearly anticipated logical
positivism.

The logic employed by current-traditional teachers was
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almost always the informal kind.

The propositional calculus

being deyeloped by Russell and Whitehead and their followers
was too large and abstruse to be mentioned in a composition
class, and because of specialization and the elective
curriculum alluded to earlier, few Composition teachers

would have been qualified to teach it.

By mid-century,

those few philosophers and mathematicians who were doing

original work in formal logic labored in relative isolation
from scholars of rhetoric.

By 1949, when two famous New

Critics at the peak of their careers collaborated to
describe the existing state of rhetoric, practically no one

advocated teaching formal logic along with rhetoric.

Brooks

and Warren voiced confidence that the student need not

burden himself with formal logic:

"...to learn to think

straight is the aim of your education..." (Brooks and Warren
1). "As for logical thinking," you already use it in

everyday life; you need merely "to apply it to the subject
at hand..." (8). Nevertheless, to develop the "it," the

authors included sub-chapters on propositions, evidence,
induction, deduction, fallacies, and implied syllogisms.

The 928-page Modern Rhetoric was heavily weighted toward
analysis of selected passages, models and readings.
Composition could not reach up into the ratified world of
the new theoretical logic, and didn't feel the need of doing
SO; but the rational, positivistic, analytical basis of

55

current-traditional rhetoric is present as Berlin describes
•it.

Berlin brings the semanticist S.I. Hayakawa into the

objectivist tent.

I'm not sure he belongs there.

His

Language in Thoucfht and Action is in part a semantical

critique of formal logic.

"The belief that logic will

substantially reduce misunderstanding is widely and
uncritically held," he asserts (241). But logic only works
within communities of discourse whose members not only share

a common language, but are able as well to "police" it.

He

finds Aristotle outdated and recommends against "the

assiduous study and practice of traditional, two-valued

logic..." (241).

Thus the conservative wire-puller would

pull the plug on Aristotle and traditional logic.
Furthermore, his critique of "two-valued" logic--meaning a
logic that allows only dualities Of right-wrong or
true-false, as opposed to gradations of rightness or

truth--might be construed as anti-positivist.

That said,

Hayakawa perhaps displays enough zealous confidence in the

explanatory power of semantics to qualify as a positivist,
though hot a logical one.

So he shares tent space after all

with the current-traditionalists, and also with purveyors of

rhetoric based on structural linguistics and behavioral
psychology.

Berlin cites several historical examples of.subjective
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rhetoric> fro

through Emerson andThoreau, past the

rhetoric of "liberal culture" and down to Rogers and Maslow.

Subjective rhetoric "locates truth either within the
individual or within a realm that is accessible only to the
individual's internal apprehension

" (Berlin, 20th, 11).

Composition pedagogy based on such a rhetoric typically
searches for original metaphor, fosters autobiographical
writing, emphasizes such practices as journal writing,
freewriting and peer-editing groups, and seeks to cultivate
the unique voice and vision of the individual student.

The

teacher becomes less of an authority and more of a

CO-learner.

Practioners of the art of subjective rhetoric

tend to be explicitly hostile to logic if they mention it at
all, and it's easy to see why.

Their theoretical

orientation views students as possessing the innate ability
to write, but lacking the confidence.

Students have been

discouraged by their experience in school from believing
that they can write, or they write so fearfully and

carefully that their creativity is stifled.

The solution

for such writers is not to impose tests of logical validity
on their writing, which would only inhibit them more, but to

remove such blocks, thereby freeing the subconscious mind,

accessing existing knowledge, and allowing the writer's
individual voice to resonate on the printed page.

Such a

pedagogy must value the subconscious "logic" of associations
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and feelings over the artificial logic of terms and

propositions.

Echoing Bacon's dismissal of Aristotle, such

teachers often refer to logic as sterile, or even

oppressive.

If logic fits at all into the processes of

subjective rhetoric, it is late in the revision stage, after
the fact of inspiration, when it is time to bring coherence

to the nearly finished product.

Logical thinking as a habit

of mind is seen as an impediment to writing in the student,
and in the teacher, a source of intimidation that he should
consciously suppress in the classroom.

The most eloquent defense I've seen of subjective
rhetoric is Elbow's Writing Without Teachers.

To this short

primer on "teacherless writing" the author appends an essay

meant to justify his methods to a skeptical academy.

In it.

Elbow distinguishes between the "doubting game" and the

"believing game."

Starting with the quote from Alice about

believing impossible things. Elbow characterizes the
traditional academic enterprise as one of doubting, of

seeking truth by ferreting out error, of teaching writing by

pointing out faults.

The "machinery of symbolic logic," he

notes, helps in the doubting game by factoring out the self
(Elbow 148).

Elbow finds that the doubt induced by years of

formal education may ricochet back to the student, turning
into self-doubt and blocking the writing process.

contrast, the believing game replaces doubt with a
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By

purposefully naive credulity.

Elbow invokes Tertullian:

"Credo ut intelligam" (I believe in order to understand).

All assertions may be "believed," even absurd ones, in the
sense that the believer makes an earnest effort to

understand or postulate the people who make them.

The

doubting game values logic and the dialectic of

propositions; the believing game, metaphor (remember
Emerson!) and the dialectic of experience.

The one extracts

the self; the other re-inserts it.

Elbow is willing to risk absurdity for the reward of

tapping into the power of belief.

But he does so with both

eyes open, and makes it clear that he still values the

doubting tradition of Socrates and Descartes.

His thesis is

that the doubting game has held a monopoly over Western

culture for too long, and needs to move over and grant

legitimacy to the believihg game, so that the two may sit
side-by-side and reinforce each other.

Logic does not die

under Elbow's regime, but its mechanical buzz is muffled
while Student voices are nurtured.

Is rhetoric complete when doubt and belief co-exist?
Berlin would say no, if it means that the grounds for

knowing remain confined to the objective and the subjective.
Berlin holds out for a transactional rhetoric "based on an

epistemology that sees truth as arising out of the
interaction of the elements of the rhetorical
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situation"--rhetor, objeGt, audience,: and language (20th.

15).

Hesdistinguish^^

types of trahsactional

rhetoric. ;The first 6f, these, the Claissical, refers to the
Aristotelian tradition, a comprehensive body of thought that

regards noh-scientific knowledge as soCially-cQnstructed
phenomena, rather than as objective fact.

In this ancient

formulation, science, math and logic deal with facts outside
the domain of rhetoric.

Rhetoric takes over at the point

where fact cannot be established and agreed on.

(But logic,

math and science may contribute to the rhetorical resolution

of disputes.) Complete and internally harmonious, classical
rhetoric underwent a revival in the 1960's with the

publication of Edward Corbett's Classical Rhetoric for the
Modern Student and articles by Corbett, Hughes, Price,

Raymond and others.

In the early 1960's, classical rhetoric

helped provide material for the emerging discipline of
composition studies, as opposed to the old one of rhetoric.
Stephen North fixes the birth of "modern Composition,

capital C" at 1963 (15).

At that time, an educational

reform movement in English studies sought to replace the old

Dewey-inspired progressive education with more clearly
defined subject matter, and college composition teachers,

realizing that their subject consisted of some fifty years
of practitioner lore without a research base, or the rules

for making such a base, saw the necessity of assuming
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authority for scholarship in their field.

Until such time

as the composition community could develop and pursue its
own research methodology, it had to make do with the
materials at hand.

There in the closet was the same baggage

from antiquity that had been abandoned in Adams' time, and
again by the 20th century logicians.

Corbett et al

gratefully rediscovered Aristotle, as some academic
community or other seems to do, once or twice per century.

Passing over "cognitive rhetoric," we see in Berlin's
embrace of "epistemic rhetoric" a quest for that Holy Grail
of academe--philosophic unity of the disciplines.

If

consummated under the terms of the epistemics, one might

expect to see a further decline in the prestige of logic, at
least the formal kind.

Epistemic rhetoric holds that all

knowledge-making, without exception, is rhetorical activity.
Physical science, math, logic itself, as well as the
"softer" human sciences, all must rely on rhetoric to create

meaning.

Such a formulation would not only restore rhetoric

to the center of higher education, but would make it central
to each discipline.

Seen in relation to the past, it is a

truly radical idea.

Viewed in the context of modern

philosophical relativism, and the resulting unmet need to
have something absolute to hang one's intellectual hat on,

epistemic rhetoric becomes understandable, even "logical."
Here, the absolute is that there are no absolutes.
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All

knowledge is subject to negotiation and re-negotiation.
Certainty is inherently suspect.

Each community, each

discipline makes its own rules for making knowledge, as they
do now; but the rules and the knowledge they produce are

contingent, even in the "hardest" of sciences.
The advantages of such a world view to the academy are

obvious.

It would help guard against false certainty,

against the closure of academic minds to new ways of looking
at things. It would encourage a proper sense of humility in
the face of humankind's imperfect ability to know.

It would

foster habits of listening and attitudes of acceptance that

might, in spite of human nature, restore civility to
campuses split and frayed by the culture wars.

And it would

make multi-culturalism easier for such campuses to digest.

New or dissenting groups could advance their agendas without
having to overcome the solidification into absolutes of

practices, procedures, theories and literary canons that
are, at the core, contingent and negotiable.

Advocates of

epistemic rhetoric would in this light seem to be ahead of
the curve in campus politics.

Meanwhile, of course, informal logic and logic-based
modes of discourse have remained a part of the college
composition pedagogy.

A survey of a dozen popular textbooks

bears this out. One worthy of mention because of its

emphasis on logic is Martin, Ohman and Wheatley's The Logic
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and Rhetoric of Composition.

The book's unstated premises

are that the students of the era (the 1960's) needed help

with logical thinking, and that it was appropriate for the

composition teacher to supply it.

Discursive in tone and

measured in pace, the book takes teacher and student on a

tour of the landscape of informal logic as it elicits

(hopefully) logical writing by exercises scattered through
the text.

Logic-based chapters on explanation, speech acts,

proving and persuasion, containing some two dozen

sub-headings such as "The Uses of Definition,"

"The Limits

of Logic," and "The Ethics of Persuasion," precede sections
on style, diction and correctness.

In that it implies

belief that students can and should learn discourse without

first having to master correctness, it is consistent with
later theorists, such as Shaughnessy.

is interesting.

The chapter on proof

In it the authors echo Brooks and Warren:

"Most educated people reason well enough for most purposes,
most of the time" (Martin et al. 85).

Yet the first half of

the book is as much a primer on logic as a composition text.
Teachers who have the inclination and time to teach logic to

their composition students might find this text congenial.
Like many of the texts I reviewed, it squirms against

placement in Berlin's taxonomy.

Current-traditional in its

emphasis on reason, it is transactional in its awareness of
the limits of logic and of the social context of
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knowledge-making.

Logic texts by Irving Copi, Monroe Beardsley and others
have influenced composition teachers and have even been used

in the composition classroom.

Martin et al acknowledge a

debt to Beardsley, whose various editions of Thinking
Straiaht have been in wide use for decades.

Of particular

interest to composition teachers are Beardsley's distinction
between rhetoric (does it convince) and logic (should it

convince); his rules of "grouping" and "direction" for

oirganizing evidence (see p.19); the tree diagram for
analyzing arguments,* and his introductory defense of
objective thinking.

Copi's Introduction to Locfic (seven

editions from 1953 to 1986) defines logic in its rhetorical
context. W.V. Quihe's Methods of Logic, also cited by

Martin, emphasizes symbolic logic systems with only indirect
relevance to composition.
also been influential.

Stephen Toulmin's writings have

According to Fulkerson, Toulmin's

six-part model for informal logical analysis is incorporated
into some composition textbooks (although in isolation,* see
Fulkerson 445). Trimbur reports that the controversial

University of Texas program that stipulated a political
Content for all sections of freshman composition also

stipulated the teaching of Toulmin's concepts of claims and
warrants as tools for evaluating the course readings,
suggesting a less restrictive agenda for the course than its
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media critics claimed to have discovered.

Another critical

thinking text, Howard Kahane'S Logic and Contemporary

Rhetoric, is distinguished by its accessibility, its

emphasis on current topical examples, and its discussion of
"impediments to reasoning" (provincialism, loyalty, wishful
thinking, etc.) to complement the usual material on
fallacies. Some texts, such as Axelrod and Cooper's St.

Martin's Guide to Writing, take a middle position, offering
both subjective and objective modes of discourse in
sufficient quantity to enable the teacher to emphasize one
approach or the other, according to the teacher's preference

or the perceived needs Of the class.

Like most composition

texts, St. Martin's contains a section on logical fallacies
and how to avoid them. Most chapters present a "Guides for
Writing" section that provides invention and organizing

strategies tailored for the particular mode under focus.

In

general, today's composition texts incorporate at least some

principles from informal logic.

But I found no recent text

that follows the model of Martin, making instruction in
logic central to the teaching of composition.

More typical

of current trends is Linda Flowei's Problem-solving

Strategies for Writers.

This book mentions logic only in

passing, giving instead practical advice on prganization,
invention, etc.

The "issue tree," elements from

Ghristenseh's "generative rhetorics," and Rogerian argument
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are ■ presented, the organizing prihciple being Flowers' goal

of making the ibenefits of traditional fhetorid and modern

scholarship avaiia^^

to the writer at the point of need.

Judging from the sample I reviewed, the presentation of
logic in the college composition classroom, once a

systematic undertaking, is now done haphazardly as interest
in it wanes, and as other activities, notably
autobiographical writing, compete successfully for
instruction time.

The logic that does get taught is alarmingly deficient
in the opinion of Fulkerson, who takes the writers of
■ composition textbooks to task for their shortcomings as
logicians.

Noting that the texts deal with at least two

paradigms--logic, and writing as process--Fulkerson finds
that the logic component often fails to integrate with the
writing process as presented. The breakdown occurs because
the process that the student would have to follow to meet

the criteria of the logic component is not delineated.
"Almost never do the two paradigms meet in composition
textbooks" (Fulkerson 445).

Only one, Rottenberg's Elements

of Argument. integrates the two to Fulkerson's satisfaction.

One reason for this bleak assessment is, I suspect, the lack

of time and space to do justice to the complexity of the
subject.

This situation results in the emphasis on fallacy,

which he shows to be inherently negative.
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"It [fallacy

theory] tells studehts some argumentative moves to avoid,

but not how to reason well" (443).

Perhaps more significant

is the fact that, as a group, the present (indeed, the last
several) generations of composition teachers have not had
formal training in logic themselves, beyond a course or two

as undergraduates. , From medieval times through the middle

of the last century, the educated elite knew both rhetoric
and logic.

As we have seen, the link between the two

disciplines underwent severe strain with the demise of
classical rhetoric and the rise of middle-period (Boolean)
logic.

The link snapped at the century's turn when the

elective curriculum pulled against the quantum advances in
logic under Russell.

The resulting gap has been partially

plugged by informal logic, but rhetorical theory has been so
changeable in recent years that authors of textbooks have
had difficulty formulating an approach to logic that mates

with their approach to rhetoric.
If logic is important in the teaching of composition,
then the field of composition studies is at, or near, a

point of crisis.

Logic is still taught, but often in a

fragmentary way that fails to integrate logic's discipline
with the writing process.

The emphasis given to concerns of

logic has waned while the process model has emerged as the
dominant paradigm in the field, and subjective rhetoric has

challenged the traditional logic-based pedagogy.
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There is

no consensus or operating ag^reement on what if any logic
should be taught in the composition classroom, and how to

teach it.

Many academics, both within and without the

field, are at best skeptical toward logic, and sometimes

openly hostile toward it, even while using it in their own
rhetoric.

There is in progress a debate within academia

about the validity and place of logic, the outcome of which
will determine the fate of logic as it relates to

composition.

If there is no outcome, we will continue to

muddle through.

The current debate is a continuation of a very old one.

As we have seen, Zeno ridiculed logic a century before
Aristotle, whose works have been attacked periodically down

through the ages. But the current debate adds new

perspectives that need to be listened to.

Before advancing

my opinions on how the debate ought to be resolved, I shall

briefly consider some of these new perspectives.

My

personal bias has not been lost on the attentive reader.

I

am arguing for the re-strengthening of logic across the
curriculum, not just within composition studies.

For this

position to be persuasive, prbponents of the logic-based
curriculum will have bo answer its coritemporary critics, and
to do this, i must consider, however briefly, the cultural
ramfications of the debate, giving particular focus to the

problem of the survival of democracy in the post-modern
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cultural environment

IV

Deconstruction, reader-response criticism,
multiculturalism and feminism deserve to be treated in far

more depth than I have space for here.

But they have some

common elements, including a shared critique of logic that

is implicit in their approach to knowledge-making, and often
stated explicitly.

The four movements overlap in

membership; most of the humanities professors and
instructors I've met consider themselves members of all four

groups, or are at least sympathetic to their goals.

They

have each had a transforming impact on campus, and feminism

has rearranged the cultural and political landscape of
America.

I have heard Derrida and Tompkins discussed in

high school faculty rooms; feminist and multi-culturalist
input has re-written the high school literature anthology
and seems poised to re-write the canon of required

book-length works as well.

These forces beg for inclusion

in any discussion of logic.
As Culler points out, Derrida and deMan were capable of

minute logical explication of texts, but their method was to
push to the point where logic can no longer account for the

phenomenon under study (usually but not necessarily a
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literary text), and then move beyond that point.
quotes Miller:

Culler

"In fact, the moment when logic fails in

their work is the moment of their deepest penetration.
(Culler 23).

"

The irrational, or the "uncanny," is thus in

deconstruction privileged over logic.

As an instrument of

literary criticism, it is hard to find fault with
deconstruction On this ground.
are not exercises in logic.

Literary works, after all,

But the success of

deconstruction has worked to discredit logic generally,

partly by the repeated spectacle of logic failing to deliver
the most convincing readings, but also because

deconstruction set itself in opposition not only to
formalistic analysis, but also to the more recent critical V

approaches of structuralism and semiotics, all of which are

logic-based and positivistic (Miller's formulation, with
which Culler voices reservations).

Properly understood,

deconstruction affirms what most critics, even the most

traditional, have long known to be true--that logic can't
"read" a literary work, or prove one reading superior to
another.

Reader-response criticism has had the same effect of
upsetting traditional assumptions about how to read a
literary text.

A reaction against the practice of close

analysis of texts in isolation from their social contexts

and circumstances of creatibn, reader response is to the
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reader what deconstruction is to the critic.

It removes

responsibility for meaning-making from author and text, and

places it on the reader.
and authority.

With responsibility comes power

Since different readers produce different

readings, it follows that no definitive, "correct" reading
can be proved.

Logic stresses correctness; it dictates that

two contradictory accounts of the same object cannot both be
true.

Therefore, at least in literary criticism, logic

dictates that logic won't work.

Reader-response criticism

thus has a deconstructing effect on formalistic analysis.
Multiculturalism is a growing force on campus that

appears to have a glorious future, given the increasing
diversity of the university community and the demographics
of society at large. Multiculturalist theory is suspicious
of logic, and even more suspicious of positivism.

Speaking

for previously marginalized cultural groups, James Banks

presses the claim that "knowledge is positional, that it
relates to the knower's values and experience..." (Banks,

23).

He condemns "positivist" critics of multiculturalism,

mentioning Leo, D'Souza, and Schlesinger.

Banks doesn't

attack logic or rationalism explicitly; instead he advances

a taxonomy of five kinds of knowledge: personal/cultural,
popular, mainstream academic, transformative, and school
knowledge.

Transformative knowledge, which "challenges the

facts, concepts, paradigms, themes and explanations
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routinely accepted in mainstream academic knowledge" {26),
appears to be privileged over mainstream academic, which is
on an equal footing with personal/cultural and popular
knowledges

Banks' approach, like Berlin's epistemic

rhetoric/ seeks to undermine the certainties and

complacencies of traditional scholarship.

Logic, especially

the formal kind, proceeds from one certainty to the next
along pathways designed to eliminate error.

Thus the

logic-based pedagogy and the multi-culturalist agenda appear
to be worlds apart. But they needn't be.

The bridge between

them is the emerging discipline of informal logic, which
deals not with absolute certainty, but with claims, warrants

and inferences whose validity is subject to analysis and
testing

If proponents of logic can present a pedagogy that

values new lines of inquiry, promoting standards that don't
automatically choke off non-standard forms of knowledge,

they may yet find sympathetic ears within the multi-cultural
movement.

If they can't, they will find rough sledding in

today's campus environment.
, There exists within feminist studies a vigorous
anti-rational strain, and another of equally vigorous

rational argument.

The reconciliation of these two strains

has proved problematic for feminists.

There have been many

feminist attacks on what Ayim calls the "rejection of the
emotional and affective realm in the name of reason" (Ayim
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190).

Such writers see logic as part of the male, rational,

abstract, positivist and ultimately destructive dominant
thesis in Western culture, as opposed to the female,

emotional, natural, relativist and nurturing antithesis.

The trap here is that the essential difference between men
and women implied by such a formulation may leave women on

the margin of serious scholarship, or reinforce the
stereotype of female deficiency in reasoning ability.

Zawacki recognizes the danger of identifying gender with
forms of discourse, yet "we may have to risk focusing on

gender difference if we want to hear voices which have been

marginalized or silenced by our own insistence on rational
argument as the prevailing mode of discourse in the academy"
(Zawacki, 34).

Feminist rhetoric thus often privileges the

subjective over the objective.

As Lamb notes, "Current

discussion of feminist approaches to teaching composition

emphasize the writer's ability to find her own voice through

open-ended, exploratory, often autobiographical writing in
which she assumes a sympathetic audience."

While supporting

these approaches. Lamb raises the possibility that the
audience might not be sympathetic; what then?

Both Lamb and

Zawacki work toward a feminist style of argument that seeks

to build bridges of understanding between rhetor and
audience, rather than pitting one against the other until a
knockout blow is landed.

Still, Lamb sees the need for
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"monologic" argutnent "at the early stages of resolving a
conflict, when both parties need to be as clear as possible
about what they think and feel" (11).

This conflict within feminism poses a dilemma for
Culler, a male feminist who clearly wants the favor of both

camps.

"For women writers," he states, "the question has

been whether to adopt 'male' modes of writing and prove
themselves 'master' of it or whether to develop a

specifically fetninine mode of discourse, whose superior
virtues they might hope to demonstrate" (Culler 172).

His

answer is that "the example of deconstruction suggests the

importance of working on two fronts at once, even though the
result is a contradictory rather than a unified movement"

(173).

The lack Of logical consistency here is potentially

more than just a temporary embarrassment to feminism.

If it

is decided that women do indeed write less logically than

men, they will either take a back seat in the academy, or
re-write the rules of academic discourse.

At present, the

drive is to re-write the rules.

Proponents of these alternative voices share the
dilemma of haying to employ the traditional rational

discourse of the academy to undermine the academy's
traditional logocentric bias. The need for a theory to
resolve this contradiction helps explain the increased
interest in transactional and epistemic rhetorics. It may
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also help explain Stanley Fish.

The debate over how

knowledge is made--over what constitutes a fact, and whether
and when human certainty is ever justified--is one of

philosophy's oldest discussions.

In the course of framing

this debate as a clash between "foundationalism" and

"anti-foundationalism," Fish has put forth a theory that

allows for rational argument while calling into question the

quest for Objectivity that drives traditional academic
research.

Deservedly, he is required reading in graduate

rhetoric classes, and anyone seeking to buttress the

position of logic in the curriculum will have to confront
his ideas.

We may start by observing, in frank admiration, what an
inspired rhetorical coinage the word foundationalism is.
Nearly rhyming with "creationism" and related by etymology
and alliteration to "fundamentalism," foundationalism

resonates of religious revivals--of the small congregations

with long names that rock away Sundays in the basements of
hardware stores in towns a hundred miles to the right of

Tupelo, while smarter folks exchange patronizing grins on
the sidewalks outside.

Practically no one in academia

admits to being a foundationaiist, and few outside the
academy have ever heard the term, so the foundationaiist
congregation ought to be a small one.

though, it's rather large.

As it turns out,

A lot of us belong in that
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basement. A "foundationalist" is someone who attempts "to

ground inquiry and communication in something more firm and
stable than mere belief and unexamined practice" (Fish 342).

Fish enumerates a few such grounds:

"...God, the material

world, rationality in general and logic in particular, a
neutral-observation language, the set of eternal values, and
the free and independent self" (343).

For the

anti-foundationalist, all knowledge is "situated," meaning
that it occurs in the context of the knower's own bundle of

tacit assumptions.

To paraphrase the argument, it is

impossible to achieve a neutral, objective position from
which to make or evaluate knowledge, or even to focus one's
attention on one's own situation thoroughly enough to grasp

what that situation might be.

The act of examining one's

own mental processes is still situated, still
context-driven.

Objectivity is thus impossible.

So the

whole rationalist enterprise is doomed the moment it fixes
on absolutes.

A corollary to anti-foundationalism is that

anti-foundationalism itself can't take the place of the
other debunked absolutes.

Awareness of situatedness does

not make one less situated. Fish insists.

So we're thrown

back on what we already "know," which is good enough to

muddle through.

We may still make rational arguments.

(Fish's essay is self-consciously logical and avails itself
of logical signifiers: In short, conversely, then surely.
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since, thus, to put the matter in a nutshell.

But we

delude ourselves if we believe that such argutrients are
anchored outside our own personal and cultural histories.
What are the implications of anti-foundationalism for

the teaching of Composition?

None, avers Fish, dashing the

hopes of theorists--he mentions Bruffee, Bizzell, Lanham and
Scholes--who have sought to make anti-foundationalism the
theoretical basis of reform within the field.

Such efforts

run the risk of making a foundation out of anti
foundationalism, a trap Fish seems determined to avoid.

We're approaching an old philosophical paradox here.

The

statement that there are no absolutes is itself an absolute,

which casts doubt on the original premise. The anti
foundationalist dilemma recalls Descartes.

Cognito ergo sum

uses logic to proceed from situation to rationalism (and to
the existence of a sympathetic God).

Anti-foundationalists

have little use for rationalism or God, of course.

But

might it be possible to start with the fact of situation and
build a theoretical structure that has some utility in

teaching writing?

Toner believes she has found such a

structure in the field of teacher research, which she

presents as a mode of inquiry that is narrative and

contextualized, rather than objective and de-contextualized.
(See her conclusion, p. 25).

She rejects Fish's denial of

the link between theory and practice.
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In any event, we may

read her claims for teacher research in light of the

examples of "theory hope" cited by Fish (see especially his
discussion of Bizzell, P- 344)/ and conclude that the

attempts thus far to inform the teaching of composition with
anti-foundationalist theoty have either explicitly attacked
logic or promoted non-logical forms of discourse.

We may

expect that further attempts to link this theory with
practice will come at the expense of logic.

Indeed, the

anti-foundationalism of Fish is practically the same animal
as the epistemic rhetoric of Berlin, and may become, or may
be already, the new conventional wisdom, at least at the
graduate level.

I share Fish's skepticism about the applicability of

anti- foundationalism to practice, while opting not to

participate in his elevation of situated, tacit knowledge to
the forefront of knowledge-making activity.
strikes me as sentimental.

Such elevation

The fact of situatedness is

intuitively obvious, but its significance ought not to be
over-stated.

While philosophy may insist that pure

objectivity is humanly impossible, the natural sciences have
proven the power of assuming objectivity for the sake of a
given experiment.

Taking the example of Galileo, sometimes

thought of as the father of experimental science:

There is

no doubt that aspects of his situation influenced his work.
But such influence is of chiefly biographical interest.
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What counts

whah

on events that

expose the situatednessof his career--the revisions to the
Law of the pendulum made nece

by modern measurement

techniques, for instance--is to quibble at the margins of
his accomplishments. ; By demonstrating the validity of

Copernicus' view of the solar system, he rendered ridiculous
the "tacit knowledge" of all the preceding generations of

humanity, at least as it related to astronomy.

Perhaps we

should give most of the credit to Copernicus; perhaps some
of it to Ptolemy.

We're still quibbling.

The point is that

a man, or a few men, using observation and assuming an

objective stance, employed reason to remove the blinders
from mankind in relation to a rather basic area of

knowledge.

Insofar as science is driven by induction, which
asserts probability but not certainty, and considering that
deductive reasoning by humans is subject to human error, it

will always be possible to nip at the heels of scientific
discovery, to keep all questions open.

I cannot prove that

the earth revolves around the sun, or even that I exist, to

one determined to remain skeptical.
make mistakes.

Moreover, scientists do

What was thought to be a universal principle

might stand revealed after further inquiry as an isolated

quirk, or wrong altogether, the projection of a situated
being who was too eager to publish, whose children
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distracted him, or who was in trouble with the Pope.

the objectivist enterprise endures.

aiid: new jdi'scoveri^^

Yet,

Mistakes are corrected

made.f Sibiiated scientist, assuming

objactivity debunk tacit knowledge, and science bestrides
the academy like a colossus, confident in the knowledge that

its airplanes fly, its computers crunch, and its healing
arts cushion many of the shocks that flesh is heir to.
Anti-foundationalism isn't wrong, but how relevant is it in
the face of such demonstrated power?

I imagine that scientists enmeshed in the highly
theoretical tangle of contemporary research, such as taking
measurements of sub-atomic particles or distant galaxies,
are themselves anti-foundationalists much of the time.

Their method, though, requires grounding their inquiry in a

foundation, probably "rationality in general and logic in

particular."

The possibility of being a part-time

anti-foundationalist would be absurd to a "card-carrying
anti-foundationalist" like Fish.

But the great philosopher-

scientists seemed able to live and work in situations of

theoretical ambiguity, "believing in" and practicing a
scientific method while searching for a better one.

The

Aristotle of the syllogism was also the Aristotle of the

enthymeme.

Descartes' quest for certainty led him to

abandon all inherited wisdom and start from scratch, using

rationally validated methods; he was a foundationalist to
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the core.

In contrast

"philosophical claims...are

more modest, and more experimental, than those of Descartes"
(Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 82).

Toulmin's account of Newton

places him in the "anti" column, at least most of the time.
The careers of Newton and Descartes suggest that what Fish

finds true of composition instruction is also ttue of
science:

We learn by doing, by making use of materials at

hand, including "rationalism in general and logic in

particular," and our performance isn't much affected by the
weight we give to epistemological theory.

Anti-foundationalism cides not inhibit Fish from using

rational argument and stating his conclusions forcefully.
But those conclusions, if taken to heart, would remove

some of the pillars supporting traditional Western
scholarship--the Socratic search for self-knowledge and
universal truth, for instance--and utterly transform the way
the academy conceives of the function of !ed,ucation (such
transformation, of course, is Fish's goal).

Gonsider the

following:

...I have nothing to say against this goal [of
democratic liberalism]--at least not here--except
that it is incompatible with ahti-foundationalism
because it assumes the possibility of getting a

perspective on one's beliefs, a perspective from
which those beliefs can be evaluated and compared
with the similarly evaluated beliefs of
others...what anti-foundationalism teaches is the

inescapability of situatedness> and if situatedness
is inescapable, students could not possibly identify
in non-evaluative ways their own beliefs, because as
situated beings Some set of beliefs of which they
■
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could not be aware would:be enabiing any
. identification they might make; and, therefore, the
act of identification would from the very first be
evaluative through and through. One could escape

this logic only be saying that while the operations
of the mind are always a function of context, in one

operatiOn--the identification of its own context and
that of Cithers--it is independent. Such an
exemption is obviously contradictory...(350)

The use pf sy11ogistic 1ogic to prove anti-foundationalism
strikes me as ironic, and I wonder if logic hasn't led Fish
into shallow waters here.

Self-knowledge, we are led to

conclude, is impossible.

Not elusive, as Socrates would

have it, but impossible.

Fish's consolation--the

sufficiency of our tacit knowledge--would not have sufficed
for Socrates, who pushed onward in pursuit of universal
truth in defiance of the Sophists' contention that truth
cannot be proved, that all questions can be argued both

ways.

Should it suffice for us?

Fish states his case in

absolute terms; awareness of situation offers no "purchase"

on our situations.

The picture I get is of a climber whose

every step upward brings him slipping back down to his
original position; or of a half-blind sojourner whose
horizon recedes before him and trails along behind, with no

milestone to measure movement, much less a reachable goal.

Such a life is not only unexamined, but unexaminable.

My

own experience of life is better described, I think, by the

old "onion" metaphor.

The personality is formed by layers;

self-understanding, by the critical mind peeling back the
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layers to search out the inner core.

There are always more

layers, but in the time race between self-knowledge and

death, some get much closer to the tore than others, and for

reasons tther^t

mere longevity...An alternative metaphor

combines the climber with Zeno's arrow.

We may never reach

the pinnacTe of self-knowledge, but by halving the distance,
and halving it again, we begin to approximate wisdom.

Perhaps I delude myself, but awareness of situation does
give us some purchase--quite a bit of purchase--on the

slippery slope.

Our understanding is never perfect.

never get to the top.

We'll

But the higher we go, the more we can

see of our situation, though not enough of it to satisfy
Fish.

I can answer his absolute statements on situatedness

only by a weak relativistic insistence that, while we can
never know our whole situation at once, we Can know more of

it that we did last year.

Which points up an interesting paradox.

Fish, along

with like-minded critics of logocentrism in the
deconstruGtionist, feminist, and multi-culturalist camps,

has good reason to be fond of logical argument.
to proceed from certainty.

Logic likes

When one holds, as Fish does,

that the only certain thing is that there is no certainty,
one has a foundation, albeit a narrow one, on which to build

an argument.

From the premise "all knowledge is situated,"

one derives "no knowledge is certain," stated as a
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certaihty. The narrowness of the foundation is glimpsed in
Fish's concession that his theory lacks a methodological

payoff.

Anti-foundationalism is inherently negative and

iconoclastic.

Conversely, foundationalism, taken here to

mean the assumption of objectivity and use of "rationalism
in general and logic in particular" to make new knowledge,
is in a weaker logical position.

It has to assert certainty

beyond uncertainty, and as it does so, it invites the
ridicule of Sophists like Fish. It has to come up with a

convincing result--space travel, say, or the discovery of
DNA--to silence, momentarily, the bench jockeys of

post-modern relativism.

Is objectivity really impossible?
philosophical sense, I suppose it is.

In the strict
But the pursuit and

near-attainment of it is hugely powerful.

Objectivity loses

the game of philosophy and wins the test of pragmatism.

The

situated self is escapable only through death, though

perhaps Fish would regard death as the ultimate,
irreversible situation.

But an escape from self,

metaphorical but still powerful, seems to occur when one is

wholly engaged in something like scientific research, or

acting on stage, or a competitive game of chess.
the latter activity.
by situated beings.

Consider

Chess is a game of situation, played
I don't doubt that chess strategy often

mirrors the personality of the players (the mercurial Fisher
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being the premier American example).

Moreover, the

situation is fluid, even between moves, as the players

anticipate their opponent's responses and plan responses of
their own.

Yet, the game is a supreme test of objectivity.

Poor players obsess on their own strategy, hopes and fears.

Good players often talk of "losing themselves" in the game.
They stay focused on the pieces--the objects--and the rules
which govern their movement.

At the game's highest levels,

chess moves are much more a function of logic than of

situatedness.

Indeed, computer chess programs are starting

to win grandmaster tournaments as their logic increases in

complexity.

:

"Modern anti-foundationalism is old sophism writ

analytic," Fish suggests (347), reminding us that the debate
we're discussing is a renewal of a longer one that goes back

to Socrates and the Sophists.

The Sophist side is the

safer, in that it is always easier to find flaws in someone
else's search for the truth than to undertake such a search

for oneself.

By valuing and bringing out the existing tacit

knowledge of his students, as well as by his insistence upon
his own ignorance, the Socrates we see in the Platonic
dialogues shows his awareness of and respect for the

Sophist-anti-foundationalist position.

But he was not

content with "mere belief and unexamined practice" as the
grounds for knowledge.

He pursued self-knowledge and
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universal truth in spite of the pitfalls, and urged his
stxadents to do the sa^O.

The power of'I the So

tradition derives in large measure from the foregrounding of

rational inquiry in the context of an awareness of logic's
limits.

Such awareness enables us to critique our inquiry

as we conduct it.

It is critically important, though, that our awareness

of logic's limits not inhibit us from using logic, and
teaching it in the composition classroom.

Such inhibition

could easily happen in today's academic environment.

In his

account of Derrida on Freud, Culler discusses a series of

dualities, in which the first term is privileged over the

second, but is also in some way derivative of it:

the

conscious mind v the unconscious; life v death; male v

female.

In seeking to overturn hierarchical relationships

among humans, Derrida insists on a period of "reversal," of

privileging the second term over the first for however long
it takes to overturn the thinking or habit that led to the

imbalance in the first place.

There is pressure from many

feminist and deconstructionist radicals to reverse the terms

in some of the dualities we've been discussing:

objective y

subjective, positivist v relativist, rational v various
other ways of knowing, and indeed, male y female.

How much

"reversal" is occurring behind the closed doors of

composition classrooms is impossible to determine.
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My sense

of it is that the large majority of teachers of freshman

composition still devote significant instruction time to
argumentative writing.

But winds of change are blowing

across campus, and the unpreparedness of entering freshmen
in logical ways of thinking and writing puts many of them at
risk of failure to meet traditional standards.

The

pressures of this situation have given the momentum to the
second term, at least on most college campuses. Today's
students are tomorrow's teachers, and I think we have reason

to fear for the future of logic when today's Fish-fed

graduate students meet Butthead in tomorrow's composition
classroom.

My concern is that support for critical thinking and
logic in the curriculum, especially in Composition, will
continue to wane at a time when we shall need them more than
ever.

The "we" here is the body politic, and the need is to

cure the radical anti-rationalism of the post-modern age

with the only antidote available--a rational education.
The problem of maintaining democratic institutions in
the post-modern environment is the subject of many articles
and books, including a recent one by Harper's editor Lewis

Lapham, The Wish for Kings: Democracy at Bay.

Lapham

characterizes the post-modern imagination as a "product of
the mass media," whose "vocabulary is necessarily primitive,

reducing argument to gossip and history to the telling of
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fairy tales.

Like the old pagan systems of belief, the mass

media grant the primacy of the personal over the impersonal"

(Lapham M2)

sees the ah^

anti-meaning aspects of contemporary culture as analagous to

paganism and fears the destructipn of the rational impulse,
which comes harder to humanity than the telling of stories,

but is necessary for democracy to function.

In this thesis

he echoes Neil Postman's 1979 book. Teaching as a Conserving

Activity.

Postman was a I960's radical whose earlier book,

Teaching as a Subversive Activity, attacked the traditional

pedagogy, especially the emphasis on factual knowledge.
Conserving reveals a conversion of the author from radical

to conservative.

Postman sees the electronic media as the

"first curriculum," the most powerful influence in the lives
of the young.

The first curriculum undermines the second,

that of the traditional classroom that values and models

inquiry.

The media offer fragmented, superficial content

that is visual or sensual rather than intellectual,

resulting in the short attention spans and insistence on

instant gratification that educators have bemoaned since
television first appeared in large numbers of American

living rooms.

Popular culture, both authors contend, is

ruining our children's ability to think.
Postman's thesis is that education should function as a

"thermostat" or counterweight to cultural trends that become
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tod extreme.

Schddl should re-define itself to correct

serious imbalances.

He proposes a return to a rigorous

traditipnal academ

classroom in which knowledge of the

"logic" of each discipline would be a major goal of
instruction.

In short, school should function as the true

counter-culture, in the hope of turning out well-rounded
citizens.

His aim is not the restoration of positivism, nor

does he argue for studying logic in isolation from other

subjects.

Conserving is informed by modern rhetorical

theory and allows for the existence of many "logics."

Each

subject has its "rhetoric of knowledge, a characteristic way
in which arguments, proofs, speculations, experiments,
polemics, even humor, are expressed" (Postman, 162).
Education should not withhold the logical and rhetorical
bases of the subjects it teaches, but rather should place
high priority on imparting them to students.
Postman's approach strikes me as timely today, but the
creation of a school culture strong enough to stand up to

the youth culture will not be easy, especially in troubled
districts. Teachers today find themselves pressured to make

huge accommodations in the classroom to maintain order and
ensure their own survival, much less compete with the "first
curriculum." With justification, teachers feel themselves

agents of a dozen agendas, many of which are imposed from
outside the school community.

Principals, administrators,
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teachers' unions and parent groups vary widely in their
tolerance of change.

The current move toward local

autonomy, itself a reaction to the crisis in public
education, will make top-down reform harder to effect.

And

classes are too big and money is too scarce...the litany is
familiar to us all.

Any prescription I could make becomes

an exercise in Utopian dreaming once it gets outside my own
classroom door.

But dream we must, especially if the stakes

are the viability of the democratic institutions we claim to
value so highly.

V

in proposing the "strengthening" of logic in education,
I am not suggesting simply requiring the study of formal
Aristotelian or Boolean or Russellian logic, in the hope

that the mental discipline derived therefrom will transfer

to general situations. Carroll and others have claimed such
transferability for logic (see Carroll, p. 24 onward, and
Emmet, ix).

Such claims seem plausible to me, but I was

able to find no research results that back them up.

Nor do

T advocate a scattering of units on critical thinking up and
down the curriculum.

We have suffered through enough

piecemeal reforms to know that they aren't effective, and
I'm convinced that a "rational education," however we may
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define such an edifice, cannot be built on the cheap.

The

medieval trivium that we post-moderns find quaint was the

rough equivalent of our undergraduate degree.

It should not

surprise us that the fragmentary exposure our students
receive to a lightweight critical thinking pedagogy fails to
result in mastery, or to prepare high school graduates for

college-level writing.

Fulkerson describes an experiment in

which two groups of students were taught informal logic in
two different ways; when their writing was compared to that
of a control group to see if the logic instruction "took,"
the results were not encouraging.

The lack of research

support for the current critical thinking pedagogy reflects,
I believe, the unfortunate reality that 40 hours of the best
instruction one might hope to receive cannot in isolation
counterbalance sixteen years of brain-numbing exposure to

the electrified grunts that constitute our children's first
curriculum.

All this is another way of suggesting that logic, of
all disciplines, is least amenable to haphazard attention.
An essential quality of logic is that it proceeds

cumulatively, like math.

We insist on an orderly

presentation of the math curriculum, with yearly review so
that students who fall behind can catch up.

follow this model for logic.

We should

Indeed, the math curriculum is

the closest thing our students get to an organized approach
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to critical thinking; its contributioh to their;development

goes far beyond mere manipulation of numbers.

But the

English curriculum, writing instruction, and critical
thinking remain fragmented, and our students are missing

somethihg important. ;They are missing a coherent
presentation of the methods by which reason, which is
exercised abstiractly in math, can be brought to bear on

problems whose solutions, if they exist at all, lie outside
the realm of numbers.

And to the extent this is true, they

are missing an informed appreciation of the limits of logic,
as well.

Just as one cannot grasp the limits of calculus

without mastering calculus, so our students cannot benefit
from the various critiques of logic without first learning a

fair amount of logic.

I hope Fish would agree that it

accomplishes nothing to ridicule foundationalism or
positivism in class and expect students to become
anti-foundationalists on faith.

They need space to explore

positivism, think about the human needs that foster it,
examine their own positivist assumptions, and meditate on
the implications of their possible abandonment.

They get

none of these things from the first curriculum, and little
of them from the second as it now exists through high
school.

Although I'm concerned for the future of logic in the
teaching of composition on the college level, at present,
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the problem lies in what is happening, or not happening, in
K-12 education.

Fulkerson's findings aside, teachers of

freshman composition do not lack the means and materials for
teaching the logical modes of discourse.

The most

widelv-used text (The St. Martin's Guide to Writing)

contains more than enough material on logic to occupy the
instructor who wishes to emphasize logical writing. - We need

to solve the problem where it is.

The project of countering

the first curriculum must reach down into the early grades
and extend across the curriculum.

as the discipline of logic itself.

It should be as coherent

And its aim should be

not the restoration of positivism, but the cultivation of

rational, critical, autonomous thinking in each new
generation of American citizens.
Several disciplines have advanced themselves for the

role of tying things together.

As we have seen, scholars in

rhetoric are making the case for the restoration of their

discipline to the center of the curriculum.

In part to

support such a restoration, they give rhetoric a much
broader definition than "the art of persuasion."
Knoblauch:

Hence

"...rhetoric is the process of using language to

organize human experience and communicate it to others.

It

is also the study of how people use language to organize and
communicate experience" (Knoblauch 29).

So global a

definition invites the elevation of rhetofic to the position
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of arbiter of knowledge-making activity, the role I had

cohceived for logic in the early stages of researching this
paper., ,

Lunsford makes a similar claim for the field of

cognitive studies.

She draws attention to the relationship

between writing and thinking in a way that suggests support
for "rational education,"but avoids the L-word: "It seems

clear, then, that ...the cognitive strategies of

generalizing, inferring, and abstracting are basic to
writing...student writers must be able to draw inferences
from the wealth of materials, observations and impressions

at their disposal in prder to conceptualize and sustain even

a very short piece of discourse...a writer must produce a
text that is able to sustain a reader's inferences about the

underlying conceptual structure" (Lunsford, 158, quoting
Bracewell, Frederiksen arid Frederiksen).

Lunsford continues

with the observation, backed by "recent studies," that

"inferential reasoning skills are not taught until the last
years of high school, and then only sporadically and

unsystematically taught at best" (158).

She notes the

difficulty our students have in academic writing, citing
Bartholomae, and advocates not a "quick pedagogical Cure,"

but a systematic application of the insights of her
discipline to achieve conceptual unity across the
curriculum, thus fulfilling the ancient goal of Cicero for a
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pedagogy that "would unite thought/ language and action"

Our students need more help with reasoning skills than

composition and critical thinking courses can by themselves
supply.

In the current climate, such help should not be

called "logic."

The last thing our students need is an

academic turf war.

They need something (why not call it

"philosophy"?) to help them make sense of what they are
being taught.

They are entitled to such help, it seems to

me, if we expect them to sort through the complexity of

post-modern life, see behind its false gods, and return the

level of public discourse to one consistent with enlightened
self-government.

The proposal that follows is both unrealistic and anticlimatic.

It is unrealistic in that it would strengthen

logic in defiance of the major currents of contemporary

educational thinking.

It will be seen as anti-climatic by

teachers who may be looking for a detailed prescription, or

who may already be doing the things I suggest, none of which
are new.

I propose nothing radical.

I wish only to arrest

the pendulum as it swings toward a naive anti-rationalism,
and send it back far enough to ensure that the reductive
effects of the electronic culture find a counterweight in
the common pedagogy.

Even that much asks a lot of the

school community, including our students, many of whom

95

(those most in heed of a counterweight, probably) would
resist it.

Thinking logically is hard.

It is also, in the

form of the scientific method/ the dominant means of making

knowledge in the "hard sciences," and in its informal
manifestations, has value in nearly every activity that

involves rhetoric, analysis of texts, evaluation of

proposals, or application of abstract principles to human
affairs (i.e.. law and politics).

Nearly every profession

requires logical proficiency in some form.

Those who truly

wish to empower students should therefore insist upon a
curriculum that includes a solid grounding in logical
principles.
Such grounding should follow a few general guidelines.
First, the temptation to ratify the primacy of inductive
over deductive logic ought to be resisted.

taught.

Both should be

The distinction between deduction and induction,

and their combination to produce scientific inquiry, are too

important to gloss over.

Second, as with any subject, logic

should be presented in increasing complexity as students
develop the intellectual capacity to access it.
curriculum might serve as a guide here.

The math

For example, since

deductive proofs are an integral part of geometry, which is

commonly taught in the 10th grade, it is reasonable to
assume that high school sophomores are developmentally ready

for the syllogism.

Following the math model, logic should
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be presented in a cumulative and coherent way, with frequent
paralleis drawn between the two subjects so that they
reinforce each other.

Finally, journal and autobiographical

writing should continue to be assigned and encouraged.

With

Elbow, I believe that the doubting game and the believing
game can co-exist--should co-exist--if our goal is a
balanced education.

Who will teach the logic curriculum?

In the elementary

grades, that would be the same person who teaches everything
else. When instruction becomes departmentalized, I believe

with Postman that the emphasis should be on having all
academic teachers teach the logic of their disciplines.
Math teachers already teach logic, and the recent movement

to stress concepts and applications over mechanics in math
instruction can only help prepare students for exposure to

logic in other classes.

Science teachers are supposedly

already teaching the scientific method, and giving hands-on
training in the lab on how observation is translated into
new knowledge.

Similarly, social science teachers should be

sharing with students the logic of their field.

Or fields,

since the "logic" of history, if there is such a thing, is

quite different from the logic of, say, psychology.

There

is certainly a rhetoric of history, meaning the set of

protocols by which historical questions are researched,

sources evaluated, and theses put forth and defended. Logic
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is also invoked by historians who see cause and effect

relationships between historical events, or analogies
between one lost civilization and another.

Gradually, as

students are ready to assimilate them, the differences
between the terms and propositions of history and those of

"pure" logic should be worked into the curriculum.

And so

it should go with controlled experiments in psychology, text
analysis in English, and so on.

The departmentalized approach has one obvious defect.

It speaks to the peculiar logics of each discipline, but not
to the quest for a unifying theory of knowledge.

Students

would understand math and science and history better, but

would not get the benefit of an organized attempt to tie
things together until college, if then.

I hope we can do

more to help students tie their learning together before

attempting college study, or leaving the educational system
completely.

In the middle grades, I'd like to see a home

room or master teacher present Study skills and critical

thinking skills a day or two per week during the SSR
(Sustained silent reading) mini-periods that seem to be

ubiquitous now at this level.

In high school, I'd like to

require, or at least offer, a "senior seminar" to help
students make sense of their education and prepare them for

futures as life-long learners and citizens.

One semester of

it, called "psychology," would present the basics of human
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behavior, growth and development> family dynamlGS, and

personal relationships, inGludihg ethics, and uSe literary
texts as well as case studies and other readings. The othet

semester, called "philosophy/" would include logic and the

scientific method, and political philosophy, focusing on
some of the prominent shapers, so that high school graduates
could be presumed to know not just the names of Aristotle
and Darwin and Marx and Freud and a few others of that rank,

but something of how they thought and what they added to the
sum of human knowledge. Entering freshmen would take courses
in rhetoric and critical thinking as now, but with much
greater assurance that they would be ready.

What, exactly, should be taught?

I'm not sure about

"exactly," but a few ideas suggest themselves to me.

In

spite of having been told once by an education professor
that 9th graders aren't ready for abstract thinking, I'm
convinced that they are, or should be, and I've observed

children in the late elementary grades struggle impressively
with questions, such as the guilt or innocence Of certain
celebrity criminal defendants, that engage their interest

and require application of principles to cases, evaluation
of evidence, and distinctions between fact and assumption.
It is also true that the intellectual development of
children follows its own;individual timetable, and for that

reason, the logic curriculum in the early grades should be
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kept simple and, where: possible, fun.

Puzzles, games,

simple verbal analogies, speeGhes and debates, and writing
assignments that begin to work in logical concepts should be

part of the curriculum at this age.

Writing instruction

should include organizational concepts like topic sentences
and paragraphing, introductions and conclusions, and

supporting evidence.

Topics need not be abstruse.

"The Gap

is better than Mervyn'S," or "the Chargers will make the

play-offs," will suffice at this level.

The goals should be

to introduce the basics, follow student interest, and keep
it fun.

Seventh grade strikes me as time to re-introduce Lewis
Garroll. The Alice stories stand logic on its head while

ultimately supporting it {Alice becomes empowered when she
uses logic to critique the absurdities of the adult world,
but then must confront "reality").

The Alice experience

could be enriched with the whimsical puzzles that Carroll

devised to make the syllogism accessible to children in

their early teens.

By eighth grade, students have had

enough algebra to enable them to digest a basic exposure to

symbolic logic, preferably in a unit that coordinates this
abstract exercise with material on fallacy and/or argument

analysis.

Writing instruction in the middle grades should

include expository, analytical, and persuasive modes, as
well as creative and autobiographical, using set forms, such
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as the 5-paragraph expository essay, to meet the need of the
age group for structure. (But students who demonstrate

mastery of the forms and readiness to move beyond them

should be helped to do so).

Journal writing should include

topics that require abstract thought and argument, such as
making and defending decisions on questions of values.
Reading and writing assignments that teach logic in engaging
ways should be developed and shared.

(One example:

assign

a mystery novel, have students keep a log of characters and

clues, and assign a series of short papers on who they think
did it, and why.

Then have them trace and evaluate, perhaps

working in groups, the strategies by which the author built
suspense about the identity of the guilty party.)

By the

ninth grade, students ought to be writing short but
competent 5-paragraph expositions and 4-paragraph arguments,

and simple analyses of literary texts.

Also by this time,

students should be introduced to, and asked to explore in

their journals, such basic philosophical conflicts as
determinism v free will, personal freedom v social
obligation, and objective v subjective thinking.

By high school, the pre-set essay forms will have
outlived their usefulness and should be phased out in favor
of organic approaches in which the rhetorical situation
determines form. Teachers should be sharing basic rhetorical

theory in class as they present new writing assignments.
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They should be showing students how to use transitional
words and phrases to signal logical relationships, and how

to use concepts of grammar and style (such as coordination,
subordination, parallel cbnstruction, and verb tense) to
further reveal logical relationships.

Students should be

thinking and writing about such questions as logic v
rhetoric, positivism y relativism, and scientific knowledge
y the humanities.

Education at this level should encourage

students to focus their growing critical faculties on social
conditions, on powerful forces such as the media, and on the
tacit assumptions as well as the explicit ones that cultures
generate.

By the end of high school, students should be

ready to make college the transforming experience it can be
when one's full intellect is engaged across several
disciplines at once.

For this to happen, and to meet the demands of college
writing, our students will need to be able to write
reasohably clear expository, analytical, and persuasive
prose.

They'll need to be careful and thorough about

defining their terms, developing their arguments, providing

evidence, justifying their assertions, arid avoiding the
damaging inconsistencies, hasty generalizations, and other

fallacies that mar the writing of many of our students. They
need to become rhetoricians, using the available means of
persuasion and modes of discourse to meet a variety of
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writing situations.

These should be the goals of freshman

composition. By strengthening logic in K-12 education, my

hope is to bring more of our incoming freshmen up to the
level of Our bette^^-prepared students.

Freshman composition

teachers would then spend less time on remediation, and more
on rhetoric, broadly defined.

; Ed^^

can't force the young to abandon its popular-

culture, but it should work purposefully to mitigate its
nihiTistic and hedonistic tendencies, its hostility toward

reason and learning, its insistence on instant

gratification, its superficial worship of celebrity.
must offer something better.

It

Not sorrtething more comfortable

or entertaining, but something more challenging and
empowering.

To survive and thrive in college and beyond,

and to function as effective and responsible citizens, our

young people need to learn to think critically and
communicate in the languages of knowledge and power.
Whether it wahts one or hot, we owe our current student

pppulation the benefits ;0f a rational education.
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